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ABSTRACT
JOINT DECISIONS ON INVENTORY
REPLENISHMENT AND EMISSION REDUCTION
INVESTMENT UNDER DIFFERENT EMISSION
REGULATIONS
Has¸im O¨zlu¨
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ays¸egu¨l Toptal
August, 2013
Carbon emission regulation policies have emerged as mechanisms to control firms’
carbon emissions. To meet regulatory requirements, firms can change their oper-
ations or invest in green technologies. In this thesis, we analyze a retailer’s joint
decisions on inventory replenishment and carbon emission reduction investment
under three carbon emission regulation policies. Particularly, we first study the
economic order quantity model to consider carbon emissions reduction investment
availability under carbon cap, tax, and cap-and-trade policies. We analytically
show that carbon emission reduction investment opportunities, additional to re-
ducing emissions as per regulations, further reduce carbon emissions while reduc-
ing costs. We also provide an analytical comparison between various investment
opportunities and compare different carbon emission regulation policies in terms
of costs and emissions. We document the results of a numerical study to further
illustrate the effects of investment availability and regulation parameters. We
later extend our analysis to a retailer operating in a newsvendor setting, taking
into account the existence of environmentally sensitive customers.
Keywords: Green technology, carbon emissions, investment, economic order quan-
tity.
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O¨ZET
FARKLI EMI˙SYON DU¨ZENLEMELERI˙ ALTINDA
ENVANTER YENI˙LEME VE EMI˙SYON AZALTMA
YATIRIMININ ORTAK KARARI
Has¸im O¨zlu¨
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Ays¸egu¨l Toptal
Ag˘ustos, 2013
Karbon emisyonu du¨zenleme politikaları firmaların karbon emisyonlarını kontrol
etmek ic¸in ortaya c¸ıkan arac¸lardır. Bu arac¸ların firmalara getirdigˇi gereksin-
imleri kars¸ılamak ic¸in, operasyonel is¸lemler deg˘is¸tirilebilir ya da temiz teknolo-
jilere yatırım yapılabilir. Bu tezde, u¨c¸ farklı emisyon du¨zenleme politikası
altında bir perakendecinin envanter yenileme ve emisyon azaltma yatırımlarının
ortak kararı analiz edilmis¸tir. Spesifik olarak, iktisadi siparis¸ verme mod-
elinin bir uzantısı, emisyon u¨st sınırı, emisyon vergisi, ve emisyon u¨st sınırı
ve ticareti politikaları altında, temiz teknolojilere yatırım olanagˇı du¨s¸u¨nu¨lerek
c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Emisyon azaltma yatırımlarının, du¨zenleme politikalarının sagˇlamıs¸
oldugˇu emisyon azaltımına ilaveten, hem maliyetleri hem de karbon emisyonunu
azalttıgˇı analitik olarak go¨sterilmis¸tir. Ayrıca, c¸es¸itli yatırım fırsatları arasında
analitik kars¸ılas¸tırmalar yapılmıs¸ ve farklı karbon emisyon du¨zenleme politikaları
maliyet ve emisyon bakımından birbiriyle kars¸ılas¸tırılmıs¸tır. Temiz teknolojilere
yatırım fırsatının ve du¨zenleme politikalarına ait parametrelerin etkilerini daha
iyi go¨stermek ic¸in yapılan bir sayısal c¸alıs¸manın sonuc¸ları da sunulmus¸tur. Son
olarak, benzer bir analiz, literatu¨rde gazete satıcısı problemi olarak bilinen bir
ortama sahip perakendeci ic¸in, c¸evresel duyarlı mu¨s¸teriler de go¨z o¨nu¨nde bulun-
durularak, yapılmıs¸tır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Temiz teknoloji, karbon emisyonu, yatırım, en kazanc¸lı ısmar-
lama miktarı.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Global warming, environmental disasters, and increased public awareness about
environmental issues are encouraging countries to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 by 37 industrialized countries
and European Union (EU) members, enabled nations to aggregately focus on
GHG emission abatement. Several government programs (e.g., the EU Emis-
sions Trading System, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme, the U.S.’ Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative), private voluntary-membership organizations
(e.g., the Chicago Climate Exchange, the Montreal Climate Exchange), and many
emissions-offset companies have emerged as control mechanisms over firms’ GHG
emissions, primarily carbon emissions (other GHG emissions can be measured
in terms of equivalent carbon emissions, see, e.g., EPA [1]). To reduce carbon
emissions, policy makers either provide incentives to achieve emission reduction
or impose costs on carbon emissions.
Under carbon emission regulation policies, firms seek cost-efficient methods to
decrease emissions, mainly through replanning (changing) their operations and
investing in carbon emission abatement (Bouchery et al. [2]). A firm can reduce
its carbon emissions level via changing its production, inventory, warehousing,
logistics, and transportation operations (Benjaafar et al. [3], Hua et al. [4]).
For instance, after 60,000 suppliers of Wal-Mart decreased their packaging by
1
5% upon Wal-Mart’s request, they achieved 667,000 m3 of CO2 emission reduc-
tion (Hoffman [5]). Hewlett-Packard (HP) reported that they decreased toxic
inventory release to the air from 26.1 tonnes to 18.3 tonnes in 2010 by adjusting
operations (HP [6]).
A firm can also reduce its carbon emissions level by directly investing in car-
bon emission reduction projects such as greener transportation fleets (see, e.g.,
Bae et al. [7]), energy-efficient warehousing (see, e.g., Ilic et al. [8]), and environ-
mentally friendly manufacturing processes (see, e.g., Liu et al. [9]). McKinsey
& Company reports that U.S. carbon emissions can be reduced by three to 4.5
gigatons in 2030 using tested approaches and high-potential technologies (Creyts
et al. [10]). Additional to directly investing in carbon emission reduction projects
that decrease emissions from internal operations, companies can indirectly invest
in carbon emission reduction by purchasing carbon offsets (see, e.g., Benjaafar et
al. [3], Song and Leng [11]), which can compensate for a company’s carbon emis-
sions and be used to increase its carbon emissions cap. Carbon-offset projects are
referred to as clean development mechanisms (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol.
The United Nations Framework for Convention on Climate Change provides a
list of CDM (See [12]). The World Bank reports that the global carbon market,
including traded allowances and offset transactions, reached $176 billion in 2011
(Kossoy and Guigon [13]).
Examples of how emission abatement increases companies’ competitiveness
and profitability can be extended. Some retailers follow environmental friendly
supply chain operations via new technologies to boost their demands and to
decrease their operational costs. Carrefour uses a new refrigeration system to
reduce both emission and energy consumption (Schotter et al. [14]). They also
invest in solar panels for some of their hypermarkets in Italy and France (Jacobs
and Smits [15]). Similarly, Wall-Mart has assigned $500 million to sustainability
projects to improve the effectiveness of its vehicle fleet, decrease the energy usage
in its store and mitigate solid waste in U.S. stores (Robb et al. [16]). Lindeman
reports that a 10% energy reduction in a grocery store may lead to 6% increase
in the retailer’s profit ([17]).
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In this thesis, we consider three different carbon emission regulations; cap,
cap-and-trade, and tax. There is an ongoing debate about how these regulations
compare to one another in terms of their effectiveness. While a significant num-
ber of economists favor cap-and-trade or tax policies, environmental advocacy
groups consider these policies as “licences to pollute” and they favor cap policy
(Stavins [18]). Under the cap policy, a firm’s carbon emissions should not exceed
a pre-determined amount, which is referred to as a carbon cap. The cap can be
determined by a government agency and/or the firm’s green goals (Chen et al.
[19]). The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulated SO˙2 emission
between the years 1970 and 1990 using a cap policy (see Popp [20]). Furthermore,
in a recent New York Times article (Broder [21]), it is reported that “President
Obama is preparing regulations limiting carbon dioxide emissions from existing
power plants...”
Cap-and-trade policy is the most common regulation instrument due to its
market-based structure. Under the cap-and-trade policy, carbon emissions are
tradable through a system such as the EU Emissions Trading System or the New
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme; a firm can buy or sell carbon allowances
at a specified market price. Under the tax policy, a firm is charged for its car-
bon emissions through taxes. While some countries are enacted a state based
emission tax (e.g. USA and China), others choose to introduce a product-based
emission tax (e.g. coal tax in India and fossil fuel tax in Japan (SBS [22])). It
is reported that South Africa government is planning to implement a tax policy
in 2015 (Galbraith [23]). Since South Africa has an oligopoly in energy market,
they thought that tax policy is more appropriate than cap-and-trade policy for
their short and medium carbon emission goals (National Treasury: Republic of
South Africa [24]). In this thesis, we study a retailer’s joint decisions on inven-
tory replenishment and carbon emission reduction investment under these three
policies.
As the world economy becomes increasingly conscious of the environmental
concerns, evidence suggests that companies who make better business decisions
to consider the interests of other stakeholders, including the human and natu-
ral environments, will succeed (Jaber [25]). While the environmental regulation
3
policies aim to protect consumers, employees and the environment, cost of com-
pliance should not deter companies to do business. Inventories play an important
role in the operations and the profitability of a company. Therefore, one of our
goals in this thesis is to provide guidance to companies to make better inventory
decisions while utilizing the available environmental technologies under different
regulation policies. Our other purpose is to help policy makers understand the
implications of each regulation policy on the profitability of a company, and the
role that green technologies play in the resulting carbon emissions and costs of
the company.
In light of the above objectives, two main problems are studied. In the first
part of the thesis (mainly in Chapters 2, 3, 4), which is the core of the the-
sis, we consider a retailer operating under the conditions of the classical EOQ
model. We provide a solution method for the retailer’s joint inventory control
and carbon emission reduction investment decisions for each carbon regulation
policy considered. The resulting optimal values of the order quantity and the
yearly investment amount under a certain policy simultaneously minimize the
retailers average annual costs if that policy is in place. This analysis is later
extended to the Newsboy setting in the second part of the thesis (i.e., Chapter
5). Different than the first problem, in this part of the thesis, we also model the
existence of customers who are environmentally sensitive. That is, an investment
in green technology not only decreases the carbon emission, but it also increases
the customers’ willingness to buy the product.
In our analysis of the first problem, we compare the retailer’s annual costs
and carbon emissions with and without investment availability under each car-
bon regulation policy. We analytically show that availability of carbon emission
reduction investment, additional to the reductions achieved by carbon emission
regulation policies, further reduces carbon emissions while reducing costs under
the tax and cap-and-trade policies. Under the cap policy, emissions level does not
decrease due to investment, however, the same emissions level is achieved with
lower costs. Therefore, we conclude that it is more important for governments
to stimulate green technology under the tax and cap-and-trade policies. Several
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investment options with varying cost and carbon emission reduction character-
istics may be available to the retailer. The retailer may thus need to select one
investment opportunity. We provide analytical and numerical comparisons of the
resulting costs and carbon emissions between different investment opportunities
available to the retailer under each carbon emission regulation policy.
Our analysis enables comparing carbon emission regulation policies with the
carbon emission reduction investment option. Our results indicate that when
the retailer can invest in carbon emission reduction, compared to a given tax
policy, a cap policy that will lower costs and not increase carbon emissions is
possible. Furthermore, we show that for any given cap policy, there exists a cap-
and-trade policy that will lower costs and carbon emissions. Further analytical
and numerical results are discussed about the effects of policy parameters on the
retailer’s costs and emissions. These results can be utilized by policy makers in
legislating carbon emissions or in constructing specific carbon emission regulation
policies.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we present a
review of the studies in the literature. Then, we describe the first problem in
more detail in Chapter 3, and provide solutions for the retailer’s order quantity
and carbon emission reduction investment decisions under cap, tax, and cap-
and-trade policies. In this chapter, we also present the analytical results on the
benefits of the carbon emission reduction investment option, the comparison of
different carbon emission reduction investment opportunities and comparison of
the carbon regulation policies. We summarize our numerical studies concerning
the first problem in Chapter 4. We describe the second problem in Chapter 5
and provide some preliminary analysis. We conclude the thesis with some final
remarks in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Environmental considerations in supply chains have drawn the attention of many
researchers in recent years. Most of the papers in the operations research and
the management science literature concerning this area are published in the last
five years since it is a progressing research area. In this chapter, we present a
survey of the related literature with an emphasis on the following four attributes:
(i) what the research question of the study is about, (ii) in what ways the study
differs from others, (iii) what the basic models and solution methods in the study
are, and (iv) how the study contributes to the literature.
Our review of the literature is based on a classification of the studies into two
groups (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). First group of papers propose emission
reduction through better production/inventory related decisions. Second group
of studies consider investing in green technologies for emission reduction.
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Table 2.1: Studies in the Literature (Part I)
Studies on Emission Reduction via Replanning Inventory Replenishment Decisions
Paper Problem/s Demand
Property
] of Items Planning
Horizon
Backlogging Components
of Emission
Investment Function
Hoen et al. (2010) Transport Mode
Selection Problem
Stochastic (Nor-
mal)
Single-item Infinite Horizon Allowed Distance, Volume
and Product Den-
sity
–
Chen et al. (2013) EOQ Model Deterministic Single-item Infinite Horizon Not Allowed Transportation,
Inventory Holding
and Production
–
The Facility Loca-
tion Model
Stochastic (Uni-
form)
– – – Facility and Dis-
tance
–
The Newsvendor
Model
Stochastic Single-item Finite Horizon Allowed Shortage and Over-
age
Cap Offset
Arslan and Tu¨rkay
(2013)
EOQ Model Deterministic Single-item Infinite Horizon Not Allowed Setup, Transporta-
tion and Produc-
tion
–
Bouchery et al.
(2012)
Multi-objective
EOQ and Two
Echelon Sustain-
able EOQ model
Deterministic Single-item Infinite Horizon Not Allowed Ordering and In-
ventory Holding
–
Letmathe and Bal-
akrishnan (2005)
Lot Sizing Problem Deterministic Multi-item Finite Horizon Not Allowed Production –
Absi et al. (2013) Lot Sizing Problem Deterministic Multi-item Finite Horizon Not Allowed Production –
Song and Leng
(2012)
The Newsvendor
Problem
Stochastic Single-item Finite Horizon Allowed Production Cap Offset
Jaber et al. (2013) The Buyer-Vendor
Coordination
Problem
Deterministic Single-item Infinite Horizon Not Allowed Quadratic Func-
tion of Production
Rate
–
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Paper Problem/s Demand
Property
] of Items Planning
Horizon
Backlogging Components
of Emission
Investment Function
Kim et al. (2009) Transportation
Cost and Emis-
sion Relationship
for Inter-Modal
and Truck-Only
Networks
Deterministic - Finite Horizon Not Allowed Transportation
and Transshipment
–
Benjaafar et al.
(2013)
Lot Sizing Problem Deterministic Single/Multi-item Finite Horizon Not Allowed Ordering, Produc-
tion and Inventory
Holding
Carbon Offset
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Table 2.2: Studies in the Literature (Part II)
Studies on Emission Reduction via Investment Opportunities
Paper Problem/s Demand
Property
] of Items Planning
Horizon
Backlogging Components
of Emission
Investment Function
Zavanella et al.
(2013)
The buyer-Vendor
Coordination
Problem
Deterministic
(Price and En-
vironmentally
Performance De-
pendent)
Single-item Infinite Horizon Not Allowed – Nonlinear
Swami and Shah
(2013)
The Channel Coor-
dination Problem
Deterministic
(Price and En-
vironmentally
Performance De-
pendent)
Single-item Finite Horizon Not Allowed – Quadratic
Raz et al. (2013) Life Cycle Ap-
proach Using
The Newsvendor
Problem
Stochastic (Price
and Environ-
mentally Effort
Dependent)
Single-item Finite Horizon Allowed – Quadratic
Krass et al. (2013) The Firms Green
Technology Choice
Under Tax Policy
Deterministic
(Price Dependent)
Single-item Finite Horizon Not Allowed Production Discrete
Jiang and Klabjan
(2012)
Single/Multi Pe-
riod Carbon Emis-
sion Reduction
Investment
Stochastic Single-item Finite Horizon Allowed Production Linear
9
2.1 Studies on Emission Reduction via Better
Production/Inventory Related Decisions
Most papers focusing on replanning production/inventory related decisions for
environmental considerations, study the classic economic order quantity (EOQ)
setting. In Arslan and Tu¨rkay [26], EOQ model is examined under environmental
and social criteria. Firstly, optimal order quantities are found for five different
carbon emission control policies which are direct accounting, carbon tax, direct
cap, cap-and-trade, and carbon offset. Secondly, labor working hours are used
as social criterion for evaluating EOQ model. Then, an analysis is made for an
integrated model that takes into account both the environmental and the so-
cial criteria. Based on their analytical and numerical results, the authors give
recommendations about which actions should be taken by organizations and gov-
ernments to reduce carbon emission. This article contributes to the literature
by considering EOQ with different emission policies and incorporation of social
criteria.
Hua et al. [4] construct an environmental inventory model based on the
single-product EOQ model. This paper examines inventory operations under the
cap-and-trade system in which a firm sells or buys carbon capacity according to
its carbon emission cap. Optimal order quantity under the cap-and-trade system
is compared to EOQ and minimum emission solutions. A detailed analysis is
made to investigate the behavior of the optimal order quantity with varying
levels of carbon price and carbon cap. This article contributes to the literature
by proposing a solution algorithm for an environmental EOQ model under cap-
and-trade policy and by providing a detailed analysis about ordering policies
under different parameters of the problem.
Chen et al. [19] examine an environmentally sensitive EOQ model under
an emission cap in order to derive analytical results about carbon emission and
inventory related cost. The quantity intervals where emission is reduced are
derived, and it is concluded that it is possible to maximize the difference between
emission reduction and cost by adjusting operational decisions. In addition, the
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classical facility location model and the newsvendor model are extended in this
paper under environmental considerations. It is found that a significant emission
reduction can be achieved at a reasonable cost increase. This article contributes
to the literature by pointing out that reduction in emission is possible for different
operational models at an acceptable cost increase.
It should be noted that while Hua et al. [4], Chen et al. [19] and Arslan and
Tu¨rkay [26] consider the existence of a carbon regulation policy, there are also
studies that propose extensions of the EOQ model with environmental considera-
tions in the absence of carbon emission regulation policies. For instance, Bonney
and Jaber [2] question the necessity of classical inventory modeling system be-
cause of the emerging environmental problems and emphasize the importance of
environmentally responsible inventory models to cope with environmental prob-
lems. This paper examines results and causes of environmental problems in the
scope of inventory systems and proposes what actions should be taken by stake-
holders. Bonney and Jaber [2] also suggest some possible performance metrics
for environmental inventory systems and exemplify an environmental-EOQ model
indicating the effects of transportation on environment. This article contributes
to the literature by evaluating the environmentally responsible inventory system
in a broader sense and by pointing out the importance of taking precautions.
Similarly, Bouchery et al. [27] study how the firms can improve sustain-
ability of their inventory systems by making operational adjustments. They inte-
grate sustainability criteria into EOQ model and call it sustainable order quantity
(SOQ) model. Then, they extend SOQ model for a two-echelon system consist-
ing of a retailer and a warehouse. For both the SOQ model and its two-echelon
extension, Pareto optimal solutions are provided. The authors find out that the
firms can decrease their carbon emission in an important amount by small cost
increase. They also compare the different emission regulation policies and make
some suggestions for policy makers about how they can decrease carbon emission.
This study contributes to the literature by considering multiple objectives in the
EOQ model.
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It is worthwhile noting that along with the ordering decisions in the EOQ set-
ting, some classical supply chain problems have been revisited in regard to envi-
ronmental considerations. For instance, Letmathe and Balakrishnan [28] analyze
the product mix problem under cap and cap-and-trade policies. They consider the
product mix problem with a single operating procedure, and a multiple operating
procedure which has multiple available resources, production yields and emission
outputs. Unlike most of the studies in the literature, they model the customer de-
mand as dependent on emission output of products (i.e., demand decreases with
emission amount of the the firm). This study contributes to the literature by ex-
plicitly modeling multiple products and finite capacities on production resources
within the context of production planning under environmentally regulations.
Benjaafar et al. [3] consider the integration of environmental regulations into
operational models. They evaluate single and multi-stage lot sizing problems un-
der some regulation options such as mandatory cap, emission tax, cap-and-trade
policy and carbon offset. Benjaafar et al. [3] present some insightful recommen-
dations for both the firms and the policy makers to decrease environmental effects
of the firms at minimum cost. This paper contributes to the literature by sug-
gesting managerial results to understand the emission reduction by operational
adjustments.
Similar to Benjaafar et al. [3], Absi et al. [29] focus on the environmental con-
straints on the production and distribution planning of the firms. They analyze
a multi-sourcing lot-sizing problem under different carbon emission constraints
such as periodic carbon emission constraint, cumulative carbon emission con-
straint, global carbon emission constraint and rolling carbon emission constraint.
In their setting, the firm’s unitary environmental effect is subject to a maximum
emission amount per period. They find a polynomial dynamic programming al-
gorithm for the uncapacitated lot sizing problem with periodic carbon emission
constraint and show that the problem with any of the other emisssion constraints
is NP -hard. This study contributes to the literature by integrating different car-
bon emission constraints into lot-sizing problem.
Song and Leng [11] discuss the single-period stochastic replenishment problem
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(The Newsvendor Problem) for perishable products with short lifespan under cap,
tax, and, cap-and-trade policies. They investigate the impact of emission regu-
lations on carbon emission reduction and expected profit of the firm. Song and
Leng [11] examine the single-period problem for the low-margin, the moderate-
margin and high-margin firms and give different managerial advices to the firms
under different emission policies. They also propose basic results for policy mak-
ers to abate carbon emission. The authors make a scenario analysis to observe
the influence of policy parameters on the firm’s emission and expected total cost.
This article contributes to the literature by drawing some managerial advices for
both policy makers and the firms with different profit margins.
In Hoen et al. [30], transport mode selection problem (TMSP) is analyzed
under carbon emission constraint (ETMSP) and carbon emission cost minimiza-
tion (ECTMSP) policies. Carbon emissions for different transportation types are
calculated based on Network for Transport and Environment (NTM) method.
Then, the choice of transport mode for the ranges of emission cost is found for
TMSP, ETMSP, and ECTMSP, and the effect of parameters (distance, volume
and product density) on ECTMSP and indifference emission cost is examined.
It is concluded that road is the preferable transport mode for TMSP, ETMSP
and ECTMSP by a numerical example. This article contributes to the literature
by presenting a detailed analysis about transport mode selection problem un-
der some possible environmental regulations. Hoen et al. [31] extend the study
of Hoen et al. [30] by further analyzing ECTMSP. They present more detailed
analytical results for ECTMSP.
Jaber et al. [32] examine the buyer-vendor coordination problem under dif-
ferent environmental cost schemes. In addition to buyer’s emission related pa-
rameters, they also model the fact that carbon is emitted due to manufacturing
operations of the vendor and excessive emission is penalized with a carbon cost.
Jaber et al. [32] incorporate carbon tax and emission penalty cost simultaneously
into total supply chain cost function, and present an algorithm for finding the
vendor’s optimal production rate and optimal vendor-buyer coordination multi-
plier. Then, they numerically analyze the effects of carbon tax, emission penalty
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and manufacturer-retailer coordination on the total supply chain cost and to-
tal carbon emission. They find that combination of emission tax and emission
penalty may be the most effective in reducing carbon emission. This article con-
tributes to the literature by studying a two-level supply chain under European
Union Emission Trading System.
In Kim et al. [33], the relationship between transportation cost and carbon
emission is analyzed for intermodal and truck-only freight networks. A multi-
objective optimization model with the objectives of minimizing freight cost and
carbon emission is constructed and a procedure is proposed for estimating pareto-
optimal solutions. In addition, a case study is presented to compare different
inter-modal transportation networks under different market situations. This ar-
ticle contributes to the literature by examining the trade-offs between freight cost
and carbon emission for intermodal networks.
2.2 Studies on Emission Reduction via Invest-
ment Opportunities
As noted in Chapter 1, leading companies in their sectors invest to decrease the
environmental effects of their products and production and logistical processes,
or to curb emissions through offset projects. Although investment decisions for
environmental considerations is still a developing area in the operations research
and the management science literature, it is possible to classify the related studies
in three groups. The first group of papers (e.g., Zavanenella et al. [34], Swami
and Shah [35], Raz et al. [36]) study the ordering and investment decisions in
settings where consumer demand is sensitive to the environmental quality of the
product, which in turn, can be increased through investment. Zavanenella et al.
[34] study the coordination problem in a single-buyer, single-vendor system under
environmental considerations. They decide the order quantity of the buyer, num-
ber of batches sent by the vendor, selling price of product and investment amount
made by vendor to increase environmental quality of product. Their model as-
sumes that demand is decreasing in the product’s retail price and increasing in
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its environmental performance. They use a nonlinear investment function which
has decreasing return in environmental quality. They also model production cost
as increasing in the ratio of investment amount to the customer demand. Za-
vanenella et al. [34] compare the solution of independent policy and coordinated
policy numerically and conclude that coordination leads to increase in supply
chain profitability and improvement in the product’s environmental quality. This
study contributes to the literature by modeling demand that is dependent on
both the price and the environmental quality of the product within the context
of buyer-vendor coordination problem.
Swami and Shah [35] also study the channel coordination problem from a
perspective of green supply chain management. They consider a setting in which
the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and sells the product to the single
retailer who determines the retail price. In their setting, customer demand is
linearly decreasing in retail price and increasing in environmental efforts of both
the retailer and manufacturer. They assume that cost of environmental effort is
quadratically increasing in the efforts of the retailer and the manufacturer. The
authors investigate the effects of problem parameters on cost of environmental ef-
forts and pricing decisions. This study contributes to the literature by examining
nonobligatory environmental efforts in supply chain coordination problem.
Raz et al. [36] study the economical and environmental impacts of innovation
investments made by firms to change environmental performance of the prod-
uct. They assume that manufacturing stage innovations reduce the cost of the
product while use stage innovations increase the customer demand by lowering
price sensitivity of customer. The authors evaluate the newsvendor problem by
considering two aspects of product type (i.e. functional or innovative products)
and environmental effect in life-cycle stage (i.e. manufacturing or use stage).
They also present some analytical results on the firm’s ordering and investment
decisions, and ex-ante environmental effect of decisions. This article contributes
to the literature by integrating environmental friendly design innovations into the
firm’s production decisions.
We would like to note that the above group of studies do not consider any
15
regulation policies; the only motivation for investing in greening efforts is to
increase demand by improving customers’ perception of the product. The second
group of papers model carbon offset investments when a cap-and-offset policy is
in place (e.g., Benjaafar et al. [3], Song and Leng [11], and Chen et al. [19]). A
cap-and-offset policy can be considered as a mix of cap and cap-and-trade policies.
It differs from a cap policy in that the carbon allowance can be increased with
offset investments. It differs from a cap-and-trade policy in that it does not
allow carbon allowances to be tradable. The second group of studies exhibit two
important characteristics. First, all three papers (i.e., Benjaafar et al. [3], Song
and Leng [11], and Chen et al. [19]) assume unit reduction in carbon emissions
per unit investment (which is included as an additional component in the cost
function). Second, this type of investment modeling (i.e., offset investments) is
not relevant within the context of other regulation policies.
The final group of studies consider investing in technology to reduce emissions
under a regulation policy. We have identified two papers that fall into this group,
i.e., Jiang and Klabjan [37] and Krass et al. [38], taking a firm’s perspective to
analyze the effects of investment decisions on the profitability and carbon emis-
sions. This thesis also contributes to the third group of literature by modeling and
solving a retailer’s joint inventory replenishment and carbon emission reduction
investment decisions under each of the three stated carbon emission regulation
policies.
Jiang and Klabjan [37] analyze production and carbon emission reduc-
tion investment decisions under different regulation policies (i.e, cap-and-trade,
command-and-control). They consider a setting in which carbon trading price
and demand are stochastic, and assume a linear investment function. The deci-
sion maker first decides on production capacity and carbon emission reduction
investment, and then, after the carbon trading price and demand are realized, the
operations are adjusted. The authors extend this model to analyze investment
timing decisions in two periods. They also investigate the effects of production
cost change due to carbon emission reduction under cap-and-trade policy.
Krass et al. [38] discuss the firm’s green technology choice under emission tax.
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They model a Stackelberg game between a firm (i.e., the follower) and a policy
maker (i.e., the leader) where the firm decides the product price and makes an
investment over finite technology opportunities with different costs and emission
reduction amounts to maximize its profit while the policy maker determines the
tax price. Krass et al. [38] claim that higher tax does not always lead to lower
emission, it may force the firm to choose the dirtier technology. They also model
a social welfare problem which depends on firm’s profit, consumer surplus and en-
vironmental damage. Then they investigate the effects of governmental subsidies
and consumer rebates on the firm’s emission and profit. This article contributes to
the literature by analyzing taxation of emission over available technology choices.
Our study differs from Jiang and Klabjan [37] and Krass et al. [38] in two
major ways. First, we analyze the classic EOQ model with an investment option
under cap, tax, and cap-and-trade policies and provide an extension to under-
stand the retailer’s behavior under stochastic demand. Second, we consider a
nonlinear investment function. We treat the investment amount as capital ex-
penditure, similar to Billington [39], that is, some amount of money is invested
per unit time and the reduction in carbon emissions per unit time is a function
of the invested money. We benefit from Huang and Rust [40] in creating a corre-
lation between investment and carbon emission reduction. Huang and Rust [40]
note that spending on green technologies has decreasing marginal returns in pol-
lution/environmental damage reduction. Therefore, the firm’s carbon emission
reduction per unit time is assumed to be an increasing concave function of the
investment money per unit time. Through this functional form, we generalize
the linear relation (i.e., constant marginal returns of the investment amount in
carbon emission reduction) assumed by Benjaafar [3], Song and Leng [11], Chen
et al. [19], and Jiang and Klabjan [37], and discrete relation (i.e. specific emis-
sion reduction for fixed investment over available green technologies) assumed by
Krass et al. [38].
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Chapter 3
Problem Definition and Analysis
Under Different Carbon Emission
Policies
3.1 Problem Definition
In this part of the thesis, a retailer’s emission reduction investment and inven-
tory replenishment decisions are analyzed under different government regulations
on carbon emissions. It is assumed that the retailer operates under the condi-
tions of the classical EOQ model. That is, the retailer orders Q units at each
replenishment to meet deterministic and steady demand on time in the infinite
horizon. In the setting of interest, there is significant carbon emission due to
ordering, inventory holding, and procurement. The carbon emitted per replen-
ishment, per-unit purchase and per-unit per-year inventory holding amount to Aˆ,
cˆ, and hˆ, respectively.
We consider three different carbon emission policies: cap, tax, and cap-and-
trade. Under the cap policy, the retailer’s carbon emissions per year cannot
exceed an emission cap, denoted by C. Under the tax policy, the retailer is
taxed p monetary units for unit carbon emission. Under the cap-and-trade policy,
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the retailer can trade a unit carbon emission for a value of cp monetary units.
These policies are intended to reduce carbon emissions by affecting the retailer’s
operations, however, the retailer can also reduce his/her carbon emissions by
investing in new technology, equipment, or machinery. Mainly, annual carbon
emission can be decreased in an amount of αG− βG2 in return for G monetary
units invested per year (0 ≤ G ≤ α
β
). Here, α reflects the efficiency of green
technology in reducing emissions, and β is a decreasing return parameter (Huang
and Rust [40]). In each case, the problem is to find the order quantity and the
investment amount that jointly minimize the retailer’s total average annual costs.
Table 3.1 summarizes the notation used in this part of the thesis. Additional
notation will be defined as needed.
Without any carbon emission policy in place, the total average annual costs
due to ordering, inventory holding, procurement, and investment is given by
TC(Q,G) =
AD
Q
+
hQ
2
+ cD +G, (3.1)
and the total average annual emission amount is given by
E(Q,G) =
AˆD
Q
+
hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − αG+ βG2. (3.2)
When the retailer makes no investment, i.e., G = 0, Expression (3.1) provides
the total average annual costs in the EOQ model, and its value is minimized
at Q0 =
√
2AD
h
, which we refer to as the “cost-optimal quantity”. If there is
no carbon emission policy in place, (Q0, 0) will in fact be the optimizing pair of
order quantity and investment amount for the retailer. Furthermore, it follows
from Expression (3.2) that
√
2AˆhˆD+ cˆD is the minimum average annual carbon
emission possible without investment, and is achieved when the retailer orders
Qe =
√
2AˆD
hˆ
units, which we refer to as the “emission-optimal quantity”.
The problem parameters are assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) The minimum annual carbon emission possible due to ordering decisions is
more than the maximum yearly emission reduction possible due to invest-
ment decisions. That is, √
2AˆhˆD + cˆD >
α2
4β
. (3.3)
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Table 3.1: Problem Parameters and Decision Variables
Retailer’s Parameters
A fixed cost of inventory replenishment
h cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
c unit procurement cost
D demand per year
Aˆ carbon emission amount due to inventory replenishment
hˆ carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory for a year
cˆ carbon emission amount due to unit procurement
Policy Parameters
i carbon policy index; i = 1 for cap, i = 2 for tax, and i = 3 for
cap-and-trade policies
C annual carbon emission cap
p tax paid for one unit of emission
cp unit carbon emission trading price
Retailer’s Decision Variables
Q order quantity
G annual investment amount for carbon emission reduction
X traded quantity of emission capacity in cap-and-trade policy
Functions and Optimal Values of Decision Variables
TC(Q,G) total average annual costs as a function of Q and G without a carbon policy
E(Q,G) carbon emissions per year as a function of Q and G
TCi(Q,G) total average annual costs as a function of Q and G under carbon policy i
Q∗i optimal order quantity under carbon policy i
G∗i optimal investment amount under carbon policy i
(A2) For the tax policy under consideration, there exists a value ofG > 0 at which
savings in taxes when G monetary units are invested in new technology to
reduce carbon emissions exceeds the cost of investment. Hence, we have
αp > 1. (3.4)
(A3) For the cap-and-trade policy under consideration, there exists a value of
investment amount G > 0 at which more reduction in carbon emissions can
be achieved by investing in new technology rather than purchasing carbon
capacity at a total value of G monetary units. Hence, we have
αcp > 1. (3.5)
(A4) For the cap policy under consideration, there exist values of the invest-
ment amount that can reduce the annual carbon emission to below carbon
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capacity. Hence, we have√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α
2
4β
< C. (3.6)
The right hand side of Inequality (3.3), that is, α
2
4β
, is the maximum possible
value of annual carbon emission reduction and is achieved when G = α
2β
. Recall
that
√
2AˆhˆD+cˆD is the minimum possible value of yearly carbon emissions due to
ordering decisions. An implication of Assumption (A1), therefore, is that carbon
emissions cannot be completely eliminated with new technology. Assumption
(A2), in mathematical terms, is equivalent to saying that there exists some G > 0
at which (αG − βG2)p > G. Dividing both sides of this inequality by G and
considering the fact that βGp > 0 leads to αp > 1. If Assumption (A2) does
not hold, then any investment to reduce carbon emissions does not pay off, and
hence, an investment decision should not be of concern. Similarly, Assumption
(A3) can be written as αG − βG2 > G
cp
for some positive value of G, which in
turn implies αcp > 1. Finally, Assumption (A4) is necessary for the retailer to
be in business under the current cap policy. If the minimum carbon emission
possible (i.e.,
√
2AˆhˆD+ cˆD− α2
4β
) due to ordering and investment decisions were
more than the cap C, then there would be no feasible solution to the retailer’s
inventory problem.
3.2 Analysis Under Different Carbon Emission
Policies
In this section, we solve the retailer’s integrated problem of finding the optimal
order quantity and carbon emission reduction investment under the three car-
bon emission regulation policies: cap, tax, and cap-and-trade. We represent the
optimal solution under each policy i as a pair of values (Q∗i , G
∗
i ).
Recall that, by definition of the investment function, there exists an upper
bound on G, that is, G ≤ α
β
. We do not include this restriction as a constraint
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because the nature of our formulations for all emission regulations makes it re-
dundant. That is, the investment value in all optimal solutions without incorpo-
rating G ≤ α
β
already satisfies this constraint. In fact, due to the strict concavity
of αG− βG2 with respect to G and the fact that α
2β
is its unique maximizer, for
every investment value that is greater than α
2β
, the corresponding reduction in
annual carbon emission can be achieved by a smaller investment amount within
the range 0 ≤ G ≤ α
2β
. Therefore, the optimal investment value will always be less
than or equal to α
2β
. The optimal solutions for the cap, tax, and cap-and-trade
policies, as they are stated in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, justify these observations.
3.2.1 Cap Policy
Under a cap policy, the retailer is subject to an upper bound, that is an “emission
cap”, on the total average annual carbon emission. The retailer’s problem is to
find the optimal order quantity and the investment amount to minimize average
annual total cost without exceeding the emission cap C. This problem can be
formulated as follows:
min TC1(Q,G) =
AD
Q
+ hQ
2
+ cD +G
s.t. AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − αG+ βG2 ≤ C ,
Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0.
Note that, when G = 0, there exists a feasible solution to the above problem
as long as C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD. Given that G = 0, the feasible region consists of
all pairs (Q, 0) such that Q1 ≥ Q ≥ Q2, where
Q1 =
C − cˆD +
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆhˆD
hˆ
(3.7)
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and
Q2 =
C − cˆD −
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆhˆD
hˆ
. (3.8)
Q1 and Q2 are the two roots of
AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD = C. It is important to note that
the existence of Q1 and Q2 depend on how (C − cˆD) compares to
√
2AˆhˆD, and
is not guaranteed. In fact, in Theorem 1, we characterize the optimal solution
to the retailer’s problem in two parts, considering the following two cases: (i)
C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD and (ii)
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
< C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD. In the
latter case, the restriction on the maximum carbon emission cannot be overcome
only by ordering decisions, the retailer must also take advantage of investment
opportunities. Assumption (A4) guarantees that there exists a feasible solution
in this case. Prior to stating the retailer’s optimal order quantity and investment
decisions under a cap policy, let us also introduce the following solution pairs:
(Q3, G3) =
(
(C−cˆD+αG3−βG23)+
√
(C−cˆD+αG3−βG23)2−2AˆhˆD
hˆ
,
2D(Aα+Aˆ)−Q23(αh+hˆ)
2β(2AD−Q23h)
)
,
(Q4, G4) =
(
(C−cˆD+αG4−βG24)−
√
(C−cˆD+αG4−βG24)2−2AˆhˆD
hˆ
,
2D(Aα+Aˆ)−Q24(αh+hˆ)
2β(2AD−Q24h)
)
,
(Q5, G5) =
Qe, α−
√
α2 − 4β
(
−C + cˆD +
√
2AˆDhˆ
)
2β
 .
Note that AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD−αG+βG2 = C when (Q,G) is any one of the pairs
(Q3, G3), (Q4, G4), and (Q5, G5). For 0 ≤ G ≤ α2β , it can be shown that
Q3 ≥ Q1 ≥ Q2 ≥ Q4. (3.9)
As characterized in the next theorem and its proof, the optimal solution to
the retailers problem under the cap policy is given by one of the following pairs:
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(Q0, 0), (Q1, 0), (Q2, 0), (Q3, G3), (Q4, G4), (Q5, G5). If (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) = (Q
0, 0),
then the cost-optimal solution satisfies the emission constraint already. If
(Q∗1, G
∗
1) = (Q1, 0) or (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) = (Q2, 0), then the retailer is able to satisfy
the emission constraint by ordering a quantity other than the cost-optimal one
while not making any investment. In other cases where G∗1 > 0, the retailer mini-
mizes his/her costs under the emission constraint by investing in new technology
besides carefully-made ordering decisions.
Theorem 1 Under a cap policy, the optimal pair of the retailer’s replenishment
quantity and his/her investment amount is as follows:
If C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD then,
(Q∗1, G
∗
1) =

(Q0, 0) if Q2 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q1,
(Q1, 0) if Q
α < Q1 < Q
0,
(Q3, G3) if Q
e < Q3 ≤ Qα,
(Q2, 0) if Q
0 < Q2 < Q
α,
(Q4, G4) if Q
α ≤ Q4 < Qe,
and if
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
< C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD, then
(Q∗1, G
∗
1) =

(Q3, G3) if Q
e < Q3 ≤ Qα,
(Q4, G4) if Q
α ≤ Q4 < Qe,
(Q5, G5) o.w.,
where Qα =
√
2(Aˆ+Aα)D
hˆ+hα
.
Proof: The proof will follow by making use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. The objective function is differentiable, and it is convex because its
Hessian matrix
(
2AD
Q3
0
0 0
)
is positive semi-definite. Emission cap constraint is also
differentiable, and it is strictly convex in Q and G because its Hessian matrix
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(
2AˆD
Q3
0
0 2β
)
is positive definite. In addition, Assumption (A4) implies that there
exists a feasible point in the set { AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD−αG+βG2 < C, Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0 }.
As a result, we conclude that the KKT conditions listed below guarantee global
optimality along with feasibility conditions.
−AD
Q2
+
h
2
+ λ1
(
−AˆD
Q2
+
hˆ
2
)
− µ1 = 0, (3.10)
1 + λ1(−α + 2βG)− µ2 = 0, (3.11)
λ1
(
C − AˆD
Q
− hˆQ
2
− cˆD + αG− βG2
)
= 0, (3.12)
µ1Q = 0, (3.13)
µ2G = 0, (3.14)
λ1 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0. (3.15)
The multipliers λ1, µ1, and µ2 may be equal to zero or be greater than zero.
Considering these alternatives, there are eight possible cases, however, only the
following three may lead to feasible solutions.
Case 1: λ1 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 > 0
Expression (3.12) and Expression (3.13) are satisfied because λ1 = 0 and
µ1 = 0. Expression (3.11) implies µ2 = 1. Because µ2 > 0, Expression (3.14)
leads to G = 0. Finally, evaluating Expression (3.10) at λ1 = 0 and µ1 = 0, we
obtain Q = Q0 =
√
2AD
h
.
Now, let us check the feasibility ofQ =
√
2AD
h
andG = 0. WhenG = 0, to find
a feasible order quantity, we should have C ≥
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD, because the contrary
implies that even the minimum carbon emission possible by ordering decisions
would exceed the emission cap. In addition, any feasible order quantity Q should
satisfy AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD ≤ C. This inequality further yields Q2 ≤ Q ≤ Q1, where
Q1 and Q2 are defined in (3.7) and (3.8). Observe that since C ≥
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD,
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both Q1 and Q2 exist. Therefore, if C ≥
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD and Q2 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q1, then
Q∗1 = Q
0 and G∗1 = 0.
Case 2: λ1 > 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 > 0
Using the fact that µ1 = 0, Expression (3.10) can be rewritten as
−AD
Q2
+
h
2
+ λ1
(
−AˆD
Q2
+
hˆ
2
)
= 0. (3.16)
Since µ2 > 0, Expression (3.14) implies G = 0. Therefore, Expression (3.11)
reduces to
1− αλ1 − µ2 = 0. (3.17)
Because λ1 > 0 and G = 0, Expression (3.12) implies
C − AˆD
Q
− hˆQ
2
− cˆD = 0.
Note that, Q1 and Q2 are the two values of Q that satisfy the above equality.
Since G = 0, we should have C ≥
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD for the same reason as discussed
in Case 1, which in turn, implies that Q1 and Q2 exist. In the rest of our analysis
for Case 2, we will consider the following two possibilities:
Case 2.1: C =
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD
It can be shown that if C =
√
2AˆDhˆ + cˆD, then Q1 = Q2 =
√
2AˆD
hˆ
. In
this case, Expression (3.16) holds for any positive value of λ1 as long as
A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
.
However, due to the relationship between λ1 and µ2 as stated in Expression (3.17)
and the fact that µ2 > 0, λ1 should be chosen such that λ1 <
1
α
. Therefore, if
A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
, then Q∗1 = Q
0 and G∗1 = 0.
Case 2.2: C >
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD
If C >
√
2AˆDhˆ + cˆD, then Q1 6= Q2. For Q = Q1 or Q = Q2 to be optimal,
there must exist positive values of λ1 and µ2 that satisfy Expression (3.16) and
Expression (3.17). Using Expression (3.16), we obtain
λ1 =
AD
Q2
− h
2
− AˆD
Q2
+ hˆ
2
=
2AD − hQ2
−2AˆD + hˆQ2 .
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Note that, since C >
√
2AˆDhˆ + cˆD, it turns out that the denominator of the
above expression is different than zero for Q = Q1 and Q = Q2, therefore, λ1 is
finite. Utilizing this expression in (3.17) further leads to
µ2 = 1− α 2AD − hQ
2
−2AˆD + hˆQ2 .
Since λ1 > 0 and µ2 > 0, any optimal Q should then satisfy
0 <
2AD − hQ2
−2AˆD + hˆQ2 <
1
α
. (3.18)
Now, let us check the conditions for Q1 to satisfy the above expression, and hence,
to be optimal. Since C >
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD, we have
2(C − cˆD)2 − 4AˆDhˆ > 0.
Combining C >
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD with the fact that
√
2AˆDhˆ > 0, we conclude
2(C − cˆD)2 + 2(C − cˆD)
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ− 4AˆDhˆ > 0,
which can be rewritten as[
C − cˆD +
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ
]2
− 2AˆDhˆ > 0.
The above inequality implies
−2AˆD + hˆ
[
C − cˆD +
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ
]2
hˆ2
> 0.
Observe from Expression (3.7) that, the fractional term in the above expression
is equal to Q21, therefore, we have
−2AˆD + hˆQ21 > 0.
Based on the above result, for Expression (3.18) to hold for Q = Q1, we should
have 2AD − hQ21 > 0 and 2AD−hQ
2
1
−2AˆD+hˆQ21
< 1
α
. Evaluating these two expressions, we
conclude that if Q1 < Q
0 =
√
2AD
h
and Q1 > Q
α =
√
2(Aˆ+Aα)D
hˆ+hα
, then Q∗1 = Q1
and G∗1 = 0.
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To check the conditions for optimality of Q2, we use a similar methodology.
Since C >
√
2AˆDhˆ+ cˆD, we have(
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ
)2
< (C − cˆD)2
(
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ
)
,
which, in turn, implies that
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ− (C − cˆD)
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ < 0.
Multiplying both sides of the above expression with 2
hˆ
leads to
−2AˆD + hˆ
[
(C − cˆD)−
√
(C − cˆD)2 − 2AˆDhˆ
]2
hˆ2
< 0.
Observe from Expression (3.8) that, the fractional term in the above expres-
sion is equal to Q22, therefore, we have
−2AˆD + hˆQ22 < 0.
Based on the above result, for Expression (3.18) to hold for Q = Q2, we should
have 2AD − hQ22 < 0 and 2AD−hQ
2
2
−2AˆD+hˆQ22
< 1
α
. Evaluating these two expressions, we
conclude that if Q2 > Q
0 =
√
2AD
h
and Q2 < Q
α =
√
2(Aˆ+Aα)D
hˆ+hα
, then Q∗1 = Q2
and G∗1 = 0.
Case 3: λ1 > 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0
Expression (3.13) and Expression (3.14) are satisfied because µ1 = 0 and
µ2 = 0. Using the fact that µ1 = 0, Expression (3.10) can be rewritten as
−AD
Q2
+
h
2
+ λ1
(
−AˆD
Q2
+
hˆ
2
)
= 0. (3.19)
Since µ2 = 0, Expression (3.13) reduces to
1 + λ1(−α + 2βG) = 0. (3.20)
As λ1 > 0, Expression(3.12) implies
AˆD
Q
+
hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − C − αG+ βG2 = 0. (3.21)
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Now, we should find nonnegative values of Q and G, and a positive value of λ1
that solve the system of equations as given by (3.19), (3.20), and (3.21). It follows
from Expression (3.20) that G < α
2β
. For any value of G, Expression (3.21) is
satisfied at the following two values of Q, which we refer to as Q3(G) and Q4(G):
Q3(G) =
(C − cˆD + αG− βG2) +
√
(C − cˆD + αG− βG2)2 − 2AˆhˆD
hˆ
, (3.22)
Q4(G) =
(C − cˆD + αG− βG2)−
√
(C − cˆD + αG− βG2)2 − 2AˆhˆD
hˆ
, (3.23)
For the existence of such Q3(G) and Q4(G), we should have C− cˆD+αG−βG2 ≥√
2AˆhˆD. In the rest of our analysis for Case 3, we will consider the following
two possibilities:
Case 3.1: C − cˆD + αG− βG2 =
√
2AˆDhˆ
In this case, Q3(G) = Q4(G) = Q
e =
√
2AˆD
hˆ
. WhenQ = Qe, Expression (3.19)
holds for any λ1 > 0 as long as
Aˆ
hˆ
= A
h
. Now, for any value of G that satisfies
C − cˆD + αG − βG2 =
√
2AˆDhˆ to be optimal, we should have 0 ≤ G < α
2β
.
Although there are two real roots of this equation, these conditions only hold at
G = G5 =
α−
√
α2−4β
(
−C+cˆD+
√
2AˆDhˆ
)
2β
. Therefore, if
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
< C <√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD and Aˆ
hˆ
= A
h
, then Q∗1 = Q
e and G∗1 = G5.
Case 3.2: C − cˆD + αG− βG2 >
√
2AˆDhˆ
If C−cˆD+αG−βG2 >
√
2AˆDhˆ, then Q3(G) 6= Q4(G). For any (Q3(G), G) or
(Q4(G), G) pair to be optimal, there must exist corresponding positive values of λ1
that satisfy Expression (3.16). That is, we should have λ1 =
2AD−hQ2
−2AˆD+hˆQ2 > 0. Now,
let us check the conditions for Q3(G) to satisfy this inequality. It can be shown
that −2AˆD+ hˆQ23(G) > 0, or equivalently Q3(G) > Qe, for any given value of G
that satisfies C− cˆD+αG−βG2 >
√
2AˆDhˆ. Combining the condition of having
λ1 > 0 with the fact that −2AˆD+ hˆQ23(G) > 0, we conclude 2AD−hQ23(G) > 0.
This implies Q3(G) < Q
0.
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Next, utilizing λ1 =
2AD−hQ2
−2AˆD+hˆQ2 in Expression (3.20), we obtain
G =
2(αA+ Aˆ)D − (αh+ hˆ)Q23(G)
2β(2AD − hQ23(G))
. (3.24)
At this point, the above expression with Expression (3.22) lead to a unique pair
of (Q,G), which we refer to as (Q3, G3). The condition that G ≥ 0, jointly with
2AD−hQ23 > 0, implies that 2(αA+ Aˆ)D− (αh+ hˆ)Q23 ≥ 0. This, in turn, leads
to Q3 ≤ Qα =
√
2D(αA+Aˆ)
αh+hˆ
.
We have shown that the optimality of Q3 is due to the following conditions:
Q3 > Q
e, Q3 < Q
0 and Q3 ≤ Qα. Note that Q3 > Qe and Q3 < Q0 simul-
taneously hold only if A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
. Having A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
further implies that Qα < Q0.
Therefore, we conclude that if
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
< C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD and
Qe < Q3 ≤ Qα, then Q∗1 = Q3 and G∗1 = G3.
With a similar approach, it can be shown that (Q4, G4) obtained by solving
Expression (3.23) and G =
2(αA+Aˆ)D−(αh+hˆ)Q24(G)
2β(2AD−hQ24(G)) simultaneously, is optimal if√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
< C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD and Qα ≤ Q4 < Qe. 
The result that will be highlighted next, applies to the special case of the
problem where Aˆ
hˆ
= A
h
, and is a consequence of Theorem 1 and its proof.
Remark 1 If Aˆ
hˆ
= A
h
, the optimal replenishment quantity is always given by
the cost-optimal solution Q0, which is equal to the emission-optimal solution Qe.
However, if C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD, then G∗1 = 0, and if C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD, then
G∗1 > 0.
It is worthwhile to note that, when there is no investment opportunity for
carbon emissions reduction, Theorem 1 coincides with the results of Chen et al.
[19]. The next corollary presents the annual carbon emission level resulting from
the retailer’s optimal decisions as given in Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 The average annual carbon emission resulting from the retailer’s
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optimal solution under a cap policy is
E(Q∗1, G
∗
1) =

√
D(Aˆh+hˆA)√
2Ah
+ cˆD if Q2 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q1,
C o.w.
As seen in Corollary 1, the maximum carbon emissions per year are bounded
by C. However, as long as C is not binding such that Q2 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q1, annual
carbon emissions are linearly increasing with Aˆ and hˆ. For those nonbinding C
values, annual carbon emissions are also dependent on an A/h ratio, and in fact,
increases with A/h if A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
. Furthermore, the carbon emissions level is not
dependent on investment parameters α and β.
In the next lemma, we investigate the impact of having an investment option
for carbon emission reduction on the retailer’s annual emission level under a cap
policy. In doing this, we consider the following two measures: E (Q∗1(0), 0) −
E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) and TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) − TC1 (Q∗1, G∗1). We use the notation Q∗1(0) to
refer to the retailer’s optimal replenishment quantity under a cap policy, given
that the investment amount is zero. Note that, a feasible value for Q∗1(0) may
not always exist, specifically when C <
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD. The lemma, which will
be presented without a proof, follows from Corollary 1 and the expression for
E (Q∗1(0), 0) provided in Chen et al. [19]. The result applies to cases in which a
feasible value of Q∗1(0) can be found.
Lemma 1 Having an investment opportunity for carbon emission reduction does
not change the annual carbon emission level under a cap policy, however, it
may lead to lower average annual costs for the retailer. That is, E (Q∗1(0), 0) −
E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) = 0 and TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)− TC1 (Q∗1, G∗1) ≥ 0.
If C <
√
2AˆhˆD+ cˆD and an investment option is not available for the retailer
to reduce his/her carbon emissions, there is no feasible replenishment quantity,
and therefore it does not make sense for him/her to be in business. Therefore, in
such cases, the savings in costs due to having an investment option may as well be
considered as infinity. Note that when C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD, Q∗1(0) is given by Q
0
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if Q2 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q1, by Q2 if Q0 < Q2, and by Q1 if Q1 < Q0. The optimal (Q,G)
pairs in the problems with and without the investment option coincide in those
cases. Therefore, the savings in costs due to investment can be strictly positive
only under the circumstances in which C ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD, and the solution to
the problem with investment option is given by either (Q3, G3) or (Q4, G4).
Next, we study the effects of a cap policy on the retailer’s annual carbon
emissions and costs in comparison to a case where there is no governmental reg-
ulation. In the latter case, the retailer orders Q0 units and makes no investment
for emission reduction.
Lemma 2 Under a cap policy, the retailer’s optimal decisions for replenishment
quantity and investment amount may reduce the yearly carbon emissions with an
annual cost that is no less than what it would be when no emission policy is in
place. That is, TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≥ TC (Q0, 0) and E (Q∗1, G∗1) ≤ E (Q0, 0).
Proof: It follows from the expressions for TC(Q,G) and TC1(Q,G), and the def-
inition of Q0, that TC(Q0, 0) ≤ TC1(Q∗1, 0). Furthermore, we have TC1(Q∗1, 0) ≤
TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1); thus, TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≥ TC(Q0, 0). The result about the annual emis-
sion levels follows from Corollary 1 and the fact that E (Q0, 0) =
√
D(Aˆh+hˆA)√
2Ah
+ cˆD.

Under any of the emission regulation policies, there may exist investment
options with different parameters α and β. If this is the case, then the retailer
must choose among different investment options. The result presented in the
next lemma may help the retailer to make such a decision when a cap policy is
in place.
Lemma 3 Let us consider two feasible investment options (i.e., they satisfy As-
sumption (A4)): one with parameters α1 and β1, and the other with parameters
α2 and β2. Let (Q¯2, G¯2) be the retailer’s optimal solution if the second invest-
ment option (i.e., the one with parameters α2 and β2) is adopted. If β2 ≥ β1
and α2 ≤ α1, then under the first investment option, there exists a solution which
leads to the same annual emission level with no more costs.
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Proof: First, we will show that there exists a feasible solution under the first
investment option, say
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
, that leads to the same annual emissions level as
that of
(
Q¯2, G¯2
)
under the second investment option. Second, we will show that
the annual costs at
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
, when the first investment option is adopted, are
lower than or equal to the annual costs at
(
Q¯2, G¯2
)
under the second investment
option.
Let us set Q¯1 = Q¯2. The two conditions for
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
along with the first
investment option to lead to the same annual emissions level as that of
(
Q¯2, G¯2
)
under the second investment option are:
α1G¯1 − β1
(
G¯1
)2
= α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2
(3.25)
and
G¯1 ≤ α1
2β1
. (3.26)
We will show that there exists a unique solution to Expression (3.25) that also
satisfies Expression (3.26).
The two values of G¯1 that satisfy Expression (3.25) are:
α1 +
√
(α1)2 − 4β1
(
α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2)
2β1
, (3.27)
and
α1 −
√
(α1)2 − 4β1
(
α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2)
2β1
. (3.28)
Note that (α2)
2
4β2
is the maximum of the annual emission reduction under the sec-
ond investment option. Therefore, α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2 ≤ (α2)2
4β2
. Since α1 ≥ α2
and β1 ≤ β2, we have (α2)24β2 ≤
(α1)2
4β1
. This in turn implies that (α1)
2
4β1
≥
α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2
, and hence, (α1)
2 ≥ 4β1
(
α2G¯2 − β2
(
G¯2
)2)
. Therefore, Ex-
pression (3.27) and Expression (3.28) lead to positive values. However, value of
G¯1 provided by Expression (3.28) leads to lower annual costs, therefore, we set
G¯1 =
α1−
√
(α1)2−4β1
(
α2G¯2−β2(G¯2)2
)
2β1
, which also satisfies Expression (3.26).
We show above the feasibility of
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
for the retailer’s problem if the
first investment option is adopted. Note that in this solution, Q¯1 = Q¯2 and
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G¯1 =
α1−
√
(α1)2−4β1
(
α2G¯2−β2(G¯2)2
)
2β1
. Now, assume that
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
leads to greater
annual costs. Then, due to the objective function under the cap policy, it must
be that G2 < G1. Since α1G− β1G2 is strictly increasing over those values of G
such that G ≤ α1
2β1
, it follows that
α1G¯1 − β1
(
G¯1
)2
> α1G¯2 − β1
(
G¯2
)2
.
As α2 ≤ α1 and β2 ≥ β1, we have
α1G¯2 − β1
(
G¯2
)2 ≥ α2G¯2 − β2 (G¯2)2 .
The above two inequalities jointly imply that α1G¯1−β1
(
G¯1
)2
> α2G¯2−β2
(
G¯2
)2
,
which contradicts with Expression (3.25). Therefore, in contrary to our assump-
tion, we must have G2 ≥ G1. This implies the annual costs of
(
Q¯1, G¯1
)
along
with the first investment option are lower than or equal to the optimum costs
under the second investment option. 
The above lemma implies that between two different investment options, the
retailer should choose the one with higher α and smaller β. If the investment
option with higher α does not also have smaller β, we will show, in the numerical
analysis in Chapter 4, that the problem parameters determine which investment
option is better in terms of costs. Recall from Corollary 1 that the annual carbon
emissions level under the cap policy is independent of the investment parameters
α and β. Therefore, annual costs due to each investment option is the only
criterion that determines which investment option is better.
3.2.2 Tax Policy
Under a tax policy, the retailer pays p monetary units in taxes for unit carbon
emission. There is no restriction on the maximum carbon emissions. The retailer’s
problem can be formulated as follows:
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min TC2(Q,G) =
AD
Q
+ hQ
2
+ cD +G+ pE(Q,G)
s.t. E(Q,G) = AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − αG+ βG2 ,
Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0.
The following theorem characterizes the solution to the above problem:
Theorem 2 Under a tax policy, the optimal pair of retailer’s replenishment
quantity and his/her investment amount is given by
(Q∗2, G
∗
2) =
√2(A+ Aˆp)D
h+ hˆp
,
αp− 1
2pβ
 .
Proof: Plugging AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD−αG+ βG2 in place of E(Q,G) in the objective
function, it turns out be
(A+ pAˆ)D
Q
+
(h+ hˆp)Q
2
+ (c+ cˆp)D +G− αpG+ pβG2.
The Hessian matrix corresponding to the above function is(
2D(A+Aˆp)
Q3
0
0 2pβ
)
,
with a determinant 4(A+pAˆ)Dpβ
Q3
, which is greater than zero. Combined with the
fact that 2D(A+Aˆp)
Q3
> 0, this result implies the objective function is jointly and
strictly convex in Q and G, and hence, Q∗2 and G
∗
2 should satisfy the following
system of equations:
∂TC2
∂Q
(Q∗2, G
∗
2) = −
(A+ pAˆ)D
(Q∗2)2
+
(h+ phˆ)
2
= 0,
∂TC2
∂G
(Q∗2, G
∗
2) = 1− αp+ 2pβG∗2 = 0.
Solving for Q∗2 and G
∗
2 in the above two expressions leads to the result in the
theorem. 
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It can be observed that G∗2 is increasing with p. Furthermore, Q
∗
2 is increasing
with p when A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, Q∗2 is decreasing with p when
A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, and Q∗2 is not affected
by p when A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
. In fact, when A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
, we have Q∗2 = Q
0 = Qe. The next
corollary follows from plugging the expressions for Q∗2 and G
∗
2 in the emission
function and the cost function.
Corollary 2 The average annual carbon emission and the average annual cost
resulting from the retailer’s optimal solution under a tax policy are
E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) =
√
D
[
Aˆ(h+ phˆ) + hˆ(A+ pAˆ)
]
√
2(A+ pAˆ)(h+ phˆ)
+
1− α2p2
4p2β
+ cˆD, (3.29)
TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) =
√
2(A+ pAˆ)(h+ phˆ)D +D(c+ cˆp)− (αp− 1)
2
4pβ
. (3.30)
Proof: When (Q∗2, G
∗
2) =
(√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
, αp−1
2pβ
)
is plugged in E(Q,G) = AˆD
Q
+
hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − αG+ βG2, we have
E(Q∗2, G
∗
2) =
AˆD√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
+
hˆ
√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
2
+ cˆD − ααp− 1
2pβ
+ β
(
αp− 1
2pβ
)2
,
which can be rewritten as
E(Q∗2, G
∗
2) = Aˆ
√
(h+ hˆp)D
2(A+ Aˆp)
+hˆ
√
(A+ Aˆp)D
2(h+ hˆp)
+cˆD+
−α2p+ α
2pβ
+
α2p2 − 2αp+ 1
(2p)2β
.
Writing the first and the second terms of the above expression under a common
denominator, similarly writing the fourth and the fifth terms under a common
denominator, and doing some cancellation of terms leads to
E(Q∗2, G
∗
2) =
√
D
[
Aˆ(h+ phˆ) + hˆ(A+ pAˆ)
]
√
2(A+ pAˆ)(h+ phˆ)
+ cˆD +
1− α2p2
4p2β
.
Now, let us continue with deriving a closed form expression for TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2).
Plugging AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD−αG+βG2 in place of E(Q,G) in the objective function
of the model for tax policy, leads to
(A+ pAˆ)D
Q
+
(h+ hˆp)Q
2
+ (c+ cˆp)D + (1− αp)G+ pβG2.
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When we put Q∗2 =
√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
and G∗2 =
αp−1
2pβ
in place of Q and G, respectively,
the above expression turns out to be
(A+ pAˆ)D√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
+
(h+ hˆp)
√
2(A+Aˆp)D
h+hˆp
2
+ (c+ cˆp)D − (αp− 1)
2
2pβ
+
(αp− 1)2
4pβ
,
which can be rewritten as√
(A+ Aˆp)(h+ hˆp)D
2
+
√
(A+ Aˆp)(h+ hˆp)D
2
+ (c+ cˆp)D − (αp− 1)
2
4pβ
.
The above expression is equal to√
2(A+ Aˆp)(h+ hˆp)D + (c+ cˆp)D − (αp− 1)
2
4pβ
.

It can be verified by Assumptions (A1) and A(3) that E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) and
TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) are positive. E (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) is decreasing in p and TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2)
is increasing in p. In the next lemma, we quantify the reduction in emis-
sions and the savings in costs due to the investment option. For this pur-
pose, we consider the following two measures: E (Q∗2(0), 0) − E (Q∗2, G∗2) and
TC2 (Q
∗
2(0), 0) − TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2). Here, Q∗2(0) refers to the retailer’s optimal re-
plenishment quantity under the tax policy, given that the investment amount is
zero.
Lemma 4 Under a tax policy, having an investment opportunity for carbon emis-
sion reduction leads to positive savings in annual carbon emissions and in annual
costs, as quantified by the following:
E (Q∗2(0), 0)− E (Q∗2, G∗2) =
α2p2 − 1
4p2β
,
TC2 (Q
∗
2(0), 0)− TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2) =
(αp− 1)2
4pβ
.
Proof: Under a tax policy, if there is no investment opportunity to reduce carbon
emissions, the retailer minimizes the following function to find Q:
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TC2(Q, 0) =
(A+ pAˆ)D
Q
+
(h+ phˆ)Q
2
+ (c+ pcˆ)D.
TC2(Q, 0) is minimized at Q
∗
2(0) =
√
2(A+pAˆ)D
(h+phˆ)
. In turn, the retailer’s annual
costs at Q∗2(0) are
TC2(Q
∗
2(0), 0) =
√
2(A+ pAˆ)(h+ phˆ)D + (c+ pcˆ)D,
and his/her annual carbon emissions are
E(Q∗2(0), 0) =
√
D[Aˆ(h+ phˆ) + hˆ(A+ pAˆ)]√
2(A+ pAˆ)(h+ phˆ)
+ cˆD.
Expressions (3.29) and (3.30) are then utilized to compute the differences
E(Q∗2(0), 0)− E(Q∗2, G∗2) and TC2(Q∗2(0), 0)− TC2(Q∗2, G∗2). 
Lemma 4 along with Assumption (A2) imply that the reduction in annual
costs and the reduction in annual carbon emissions due to utilizing the investment
opportunity are both increasing in p. The reduction in annual carbon emissions
is bounded by α
2
4β
and its rate of change with increasing p decreases. This, in turn,
implies that if the government further increases the tax for one unit of emission
at its already large values, a retailer investing in new technology does very little
to reduce emissions. However, the retailer still invests in new technology because
he/she can reduce his/her costs significantly by means of tax savings. Note that
the total taxes the retailer must pay may be very large at high values of p,
therefore, even a marginal reduction in emissions may save the retailer a lot of
money.
In the next lemma, we study the effects of the carbon tax policy on the
retailer’s annual carbon emissions and costs. Without a carbon emission policy
in place, the retailer minimizes Expression (3.1), and he/she orders Q0 units and
makes no investment in emissions reduction.
Lemma 5 Under a tax policy, the retailer’s cost-optimal decisions for replen-
ishment quantity and investment amount lead to lower annual emissions and
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higher annual costs, in comparison to a case with no emission policy. That is,
TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) > TC (Q
0, 0) and E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) < E (Q
0, 0).
Proof: By definitions of TC (Q,G) and TC2 (Q,G), we know that TC (Q,G) ≤
TC2 (Q,G) as E (Q,G) ≥ 0. It then follows that TC (Q∗2, G∗2) < TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2) be-
cause E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) > 0, as noted in Corollary 2. Furthermore, we have TC (Q
0, 0) <
TC (Q∗2, G
∗
2) because (Q
0, 0) minimizes TC(Q,G). Combining this with the fact
that TC (Q∗2, G
∗
2) < TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) leads to TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) > TC (Q
0, 0).
Now, let us prove the second part of the lemma. We have from Theorem
2 and Assumption (A2) that E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) < E (Q
∗
2, 0). The remaining part of
the proof will follow by showing that E (Q∗2, 0) < E (Q
0, 0) in case A
h
6= Aˆ
hˆ
, and
that E (Q∗2, 0) = E (Q
0, 0), in case A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
. Therefore, we will conclude that
E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) < E (Q
0, 0) in all cases.
If A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
, we have Q∗2 = Q
0, which implies E (Q∗2, 0) = E (Q
0, 0). We will
analyze the case of A
h
6= Aˆ
hˆ
in two parts. First, suppose that A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
. In this
case, we have Qe < Q∗2 < Q
0. This further leads to E (Q∗2, 0) < E (Q
0, 0) due to
the strict convexity of E(Q, 0) and the fact that Qe is the unique minimizer of
E(Q, 0). Now, suppose that A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
. In this case, we have Qe > Q∗2 > Q
0. It
again follows from the strict convexity of E(Q, 0) and the definition of Qe that
we have E(Q∗2, 0) < E(Q
0, 0). 
The above lemma implies that a tax policy is effective in reducing a retailer’s
annual carbon emissions, but it increases the retailer’s annual costs even if he/she
has access to an investment opportunity for carbon emission reduction. In what
follows, we compare two investment opportunities under the tax policy.
Lemma 6 Let us consider two investment options: one with parameters α1 and
β1, and the other with parameters α2 and β2. When a tax policy is in place, the
retailer’s annual costs and emissions under one option compare to those under
another in the following way:
• If β2 ≥ β1 and α2 ≤ α1, then the first investment option (i.e., the one with
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parameters α1 and β1) leads to no greater annual emissions and no greater
annual costs for the retailer than the second investment option does.
• If β2 ≥ β1 and α2 > α1, then
– If the second investment option leads to greater annual costs than the
first one does, then it also results in greater annual emissions.
– If the second investment option leads to annual costs lower than or
equal to the first one, then it results in lower annual emissions if
1−α22p2
β2
< 1−α1
2p2
β1
holds, otherwise, it results in no lower annual emis-
sions than the first investment option does.
Proof: We will prove the different parts of the lemma in the following two cases.
Case 1: β2 ≥ β1, α2 ≤ α1
It follows from β2 ≥ β1 that we have α2p−1√β2 ≤
α2p−1√
β1
. Also, the fact that α2 ≤ α1
leads to α2p−1√
β1
≤ α1p−1√
β1
. Combining these two results, we have α2p−1√
β2
≤ α1p−1√
β1
, and
hence (α2p−1)
2
4pβ2
≤ (α1p−1)2
4pβ1
. Expression (3.30) and the fact that (α2p−1)
2
4pβ2
≤ (α1p−1)2
4pβ1
jointly imply that the annual costs under the first investment option is lower than
or equal to the annual costs under the second investment option.
Now, let us compare the annual emissions under the two investment options. It
follows from α2p−1√
β2
≤ α1p−1√
β1
that α1p
√
β2−
√
β2 ≥ α2p
√
β1−
√
β1. Because β2 ≥ β1,
we have 2
√
β2 ≥ 2
√
β1. Combining this with α1p
√
β2−
√
β2 ≥ α2p
√
β1−
√
β1 leads
to α1p
√
β2 +
√
β2 ≥ α2p
√
β1 +
√
β1, which in turn implies
α1p+1√
β1
≥ α2p+1√
β2
. Since
α1p−1√
β1
≥ α2p−1√
β2
and α1p+1√
β1
≥ α2p+1√
β2
, it follows that
α21p
2−1
β1
≥ α22p2−1
β2
, or equivalently,
1−α21p2
β1
≤ 1−α22p2
β2
. This implies, due to Expression (3.29), that annual emissions
under the first investment option are lower than or equal to annual emissions
under the second investment option.
Case 2: β2 ≥ β1, α2 > α1
If the second investment option leads to greater annual costs than the first one
does, then Expression (3.30) implies that (α2p−1)
2
4pβ2
< (α1p−1)
2
4pβ1
, or equivalently, that
α2p
√
β1−
√
β1 < α1p
√
β2−
√
β2. Now, in contrary to the lemma, assume that the
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annual emissions level resulting from the second investment option is lower than
or equal to that of the first investment option. In mathematical terms, assume
that
1−α22p2
4p2β2
≤ 1−α21p2
4p2β1
, which is equivalent to
α2p− 1√
β2
× α2p+ 1√
β2
≥ α1p− 1√
β1
× α1p+ 1√
β1
.
Due to (α2p−1)
2
4pβ2
< (α1p−1)
2
4pβ1
, we have α2p−1√
β2
< α1p−1√
β1
. Therefore, in order for the
above inequality to hold, we should have α2p+1√
β2
> α1p+1√
β1
, or equivalently, α2p
√
β1+√
β1 > α1p
√
β2+
√
β2. Since β2 ≥ β1, this implies α2p
√
β1−
√
β1 > α1p
√
β2−
√
β2,
which contradicts α2p
√
β1 −
√
β1 < α1p
√
β2 −
√
β2. Therefore, if the second
investment option leads to greater annual costs than the first one, it must be
that the annual emissions level resulting from the second investment is greater
than that of the first investment.
If the second investment option leads to lower than or equal annual costs than
the first one, the annual emission levels of the two investment options depend
on the second term of Expression (3.29). If
1−α22p2
4p2β2
<
1−α21p2
4p2β1
, or equivalently,
1−α22p2
β2
<
1−α21p2
β1
, holds, then the second investment option is better in terms of
the retailer’s annual emissions; otherwise, the annual emissions level is greater
than or equal to that of the first investment option. 
3.2.3 Cap-and-Trade Policy
Under a cap-and-trade policy, similar to the cap policy, the retailer is subject
to an emissions cap, C, on the total carbon emissions per year. However, if
the annual carbon emission is more than the cap C, the firm can buy carbon
permits equivalent to its excess demand for carbon capacity, at a market price of
cp monetary units per unit emission. On the other hand, if the retailer’s annual
carbon emission is lower than the carbon cap, she/he can sell the extra carbon
capacity at the same market price, i.e., cp. It is assumed that carbon permits are
always available for buying and selling. In particular, let X denote the carbon
amount the retailer trades annually. X > 0 indicates a case in which the retailer
sells his/her carbon permits, whereas X < 0 implies a case in which the retailer
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purchases carbon permits. The retailer’s problem of deciding the replenishment
quantity and the investment amount is formulated below.
min TC3(Q,G) =
AD
Q
+ hQ
2
+ cD +G−Xcp
s.t. AˆD
Q
+ hˆQ
2
+ cˆD − αG+ βG2 +X = C,
Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0.
In the following theorem, we present the solution to the above problem:
Theorem 3 Under a cap-and-trade policy, the optimal pair of retailer’s replen-
ishment quantity and his/her investment amount is given by
(Q∗3, G
∗
3) =
(√
2(A+ Aˆcp)D
h+ hˆcp
,
αcp − 1
2cpβ
)
.
It then follows that X∗ = C−E(Q∗3, G∗3), where X∗ is the retailer’s optimal traded
carbon amount per year.
Proof: Plugging C − AˆD
Q
− hˆQ
2
− cˆD + αG − βG2 in place of X, the objective
function turns out be
(A+ cpAˆ)D
Q
+
(h+ hˆcp)Q
2
+ cpβG
2 + (1− αcp)G+ (c+ cˆcp)D − cpC.
Following similar steps to those in the proof of Theorem 2 for checking the struc-
tural properties of TC2(Q,G), it can be shown that TC3(Q,G) is also jointly and
strictly convex in Q and G, and hence, Q∗3 and G
∗
3 should satisfy the following
system of equations:
∂TC3
∂Q
(Q∗3, G
∗
3) = −
(A+ cpAˆ)D
(Q∗3)2
+
(h+ hˆcp)
2
= 0,
∂TC3
∂G
(Q∗3, G
∗
3) = 1− αcp + 2cpβG∗3 = 0.
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Solving for Q∗3 and G
∗
3 in the above two expressions leads to the result in the
theorem. 
Using the expression for G∗3, one can show that G
∗
3 is increasing with cp.
Furthermore, Q∗3 is increasing with cp when
A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, Q∗3 is decreasing with cp
when A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, and it is not affected by cp when
A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
. In case A
h
= Aˆ
hˆ
, we have
Q∗3 = Q
0 = Qe. The next three corollaries follow from Theorem 3.
Corollary 3 If
√
2AˆhˆD+ cˆD− α2
4β
> C, then the retailer does not sell any carbon
permits (i.e., X ≤ 0), regardless of what the carbon trading price cp is.
At high values of cp, the retailer may want to sell his/her permits in the market
for extra revenue. However, Corollary 3 implies that if the cap is smaller than the
minimum carbon emissions possible due to ordering and investment decisions, the
retailer must purchase carbon permits to be within the allowed limits of annual
carbon emissions at any value of cp.
Corollary 4 The average annual carbon emissions and the average annual costs
resulting from the retailer’s optimal decisions under a cap-and-trade policy are
E(Q∗3, G
∗
3) =
√
D(Aˆ(h+ cphˆ) + hˆ(A+ cpAˆ))√
2(A+ cpAˆ)(h+ cphˆ)
+
1− α2c2p
4c2pβ
+ cˆD, (3.31)
TC3(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) =
√
2(A+ cpAˆ)(h+ cphˆ)D+D(c+ cˆcp)− (αcp − 1)
2
4cpβ
− cpC. (3.32)
Equation (3.31) implies that the carbon emissions level does not change with
carbon cap C. Hua et al. [4] obtain a similar result for the case when there is no
investment option. It can be shown using Assumption (A3) that E(Q∗3, G
∗
3) > 0;
however, TC3(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) may assume any value depending on the magnitude of C.
If TC3(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) < 0, then the retailer has excess carbon capacity in such a large
amount that by selling this amount he/she covers the inventory-related costs and
even makes a profit. (In practice, this should be avoided for the cap and trade
policy to be effective.) Based on this result, the next corollary proposes an upper
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bound on the value of C that the policy maker should impose on the retailer in
this setting.
Corollary 5 Under a cap-and-trade policy with a carbon trading price cp, an
upper bound on the carbon capacity C is given by
C <
√
2(A+ cpAˆ)(h+ cphˆ)D +D(c+ cˆcp)− (αcp−1)
2
4cpβ
cp
.
To quantify the reduction in emissions and the savings in costs due to the
investment option under a cap-and-trade policy, in the next lemma we con-
sider the following two measures: E (Q∗3(0), 0)−E (Q∗3, G∗3) and TC3 (Q∗3(0), 0)−
TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3). Here, Q
∗
3(0) refers to the retailer’s optimal replenishment quantity
under the cap-and-trade policy, given that the investment amount is zero.
Lemma 7 Under a cap-and-trade policy, having an investment opportunity for
carbon emission reduction leads to positive savings in annual carbon emissions
and in annual costs, as quantified by the following:
E (Q∗3(0), 0)− E (Q∗3, G∗3) =
α2cp
2 − 1
4cp2β
,
TC3 (Q
∗
3(0), 0)− TC3 (Q∗3, G∗3) =
(αcp − 1)2
4cpβ
.
Proof: Under a cap-and-trade policy, if there is no investment opportunity to
reduce carbon emissions, the retailer minimizes the following function to find Q:
TC3(Q, 0) =
(A+ cpAˆ)D
Q
+
(h+ cphˆ)Q
2
+ (c+ cpcˆ)D.
TC3(Q, 0) is minimized at Q
∗
3(0) =
√
2(A+cpAˆ)D
(h+cphˆ)
. In turn, the retailer’s annual
costs at Q∗3(0) are
TC3(Q
∗
3(0), 0) =
√
2(A+ cpAˆ)(h+ cphˆ)D + (c+ cpcˆ)D,
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and his/her annual carbon emissions are
E(Q∗3(0), 0) =
√
D[Aˆ(h+ cphˆ) + hˆ(A+ cpAˆ)]√
2(A+ cpAˆ)(h+ cphˆ)
+ cˆD.
Expressions (3.31) and (3.32) are then utilized to compute the differences
E(Q∗3(0), 0)− E(Q∗3, G∗3) and TC3(Q∗3(0), 0)− TC3(Q∗3, G∗3). 
Lemma 7 and Assumption (A3) jointly imply that the reduction in annual
costs and the reduction in annual carbon emissions due to utilizing the investment
opportunity are both increasing in cp. The reduction in annual carbon emissions
is again bounded by α
2
4β
, as in the case of the tax policy, and, its rate of change with
increasing cp decreases. With an interpretation similar to the one we developed
for Lemma 4, it can be concluded that the incremental benefit of retailer’s one-
unit investment on emission reduction diminishes at large values of unit carbon
emission trading prices. However, the retailer still invests in new technology,
because he/she can reduce his/her costs significantly either by creating excess
carbon capacity and selling it at high prices, or by avoiding the need to purchase
excess capacity at high prices with the capacity generated from new technology.
In the next lemma, we study the effects of the cap-and-trade policy on the
retailer’s annual carbon emissions and costs. For this purpose, we compare the
annual carbon emissions and the annual costs in case of no government regulation
to the results in Corollary 4. Note that, in the former case, the retailer orders Q0
units and makes no investment in emission reduction.
Lemma 8 Under a cap-and-trade policy, the retailer’s cost-optimal decisions for
replenishment quantity and investment amount lead to lower annual emissions in
comparison to a case with no emission policy. That is, E (Q∗3, G
∗
3) < E (Q
0, 0).
However, annual costs may increase or decrease depending on C. Specifically, we
have TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) ≤ TC (Q0, 0) if C ≥
√
2(A+Aˆcp)(h+hˆcp)D−
√
2AhD
cp
− (αcp−1)2
4c2pβ
+ cˆD,
and we have TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) > TC (Q
0, 0) otherwise.
Proof: The first part of the lemma follows from a similar discussion to the proof
of Lemma 5 and Assumption A(3). The second part follows from comparing
Equation (3.32) to TC(Q0, 0). 
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The next lemma presents a result for the cap-and-trade policy, similar to the
one in Lemma 6 for the tax policy.
Lemma 9 Let us consider two investment options: one with parameters α1 and
β1, and the other with parameters α2 and β2. The retailer’s annual costs and
emissions under one option compare to those under the other in the following
way:
• If β2 ≥ β1 and α2 ≤ α1, then the first investment option (i.e., the one with
parameters α1 and β1) leads to no greater annual emissions and no greater
annual costs for the retailer than the second investment option does.
• If β2 ≥ β1 and α2 > α1, then
– If the second investment option leads to greater annual costs than the
first one does, then it also results in greater annual emissions.
– If the second investment option leads to annual costs lower than or
equal to the first one, then it results in lower annual emissions if
1−α22c2p
β2
<
1−α12c2p
β1
holds, otherwise, it results in no lower annual emis-
sions than the first investment option does.
Proof: We will prove the different parts of the lemma in the following two cases.
Case 1: β2 ≥ β1, α2 ≤ α1
It follows from β2 ≥ β1 that we have α2cp−1√β2 ≤
α2cp−1√
β1
. Also, the fact
that α2 ≤ α1 leads to α2cp−1√β1 ≤
α1cp−1√
β1
. Combining these two results, we have
α2cp−1√
β2
≤ α1cp−1√
β1
, and hence, (α2cp−1)
2
4cpβ2
≤ (α1cp−1)2
4cpβ1
. Expression (3.32) and the
fact that (α2cp−1)
2
4cpβ2
≤ (α1cp−1)2
4cpβ1
jointly imply that the annual costs under the first
investment option is less than or equal to the annual costs under the second
investment option.
Now, let us compare the annual emissions under the two investment op-
tions. It follows from α2cp−1√
β2
≤ α1cp−1√
β1
that α1cp
√
β2 −
√
β2 ≥ α2cp
√
β1 −
√
β1.
Since β2 ≥ β1, we have 2
√
β2 ≥ 2
√
β1. Combining this with α1cp
√
β2 −
√
β2 ≥
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α2cp
√
β1 −
√
β1 leads to α1cp
√
β2 +
√
β2 ≥ α2cp
√
β1 +
√
β1, which in turn, im-
plies α1cp+1√
β1
≥ α2cp+1√
β2
. Since α1cp−1√
β1
≥ α2cp−1√
β2
and α1cp+1√
β1
≥ α2cp+1√
β2
, it follows that
α21c
2
p−1
β1
≥ α22c2p−1
β2
, or equivalently
1−α21c2p
β1
≤ 1−α22c2p
β2
. This implies, due to Expression
(3.31), that the annual emissions under the first investment option is less than or
equal to the annual emissions under the second investment option.
Case 2: β2 ≥ β1, α2 > α1
If the second investment option leads to more annual costs than the first
one does, then Expression (3.32) implies that (α2cp−1)
2
4cpβ2
< (α1cp−1)
2
4cpβ1
, or equivalently
that α2cp
√
β1 −
√
β1 < α1cp
√
β2 −
√
β2. Now, assume in contrary to the lemma,
that the annual emissions level resulting from the second investment option is
less than or equal to that of the first investment option. In mathematical terms,
assume that
1−α22c2p
4c2pβ2
≤ 1−α21c2p
4c2pβ1
, which can be rewritten as
α2cp − 1√
β2
× α2cp + 1√
β2
≥ α1cp − 1√
β1
× α1cp + 1√
β1
.
Due to (α2cp−1)
2
4cpβ2
< (α1cp−1)
2
4cpβ1
, we have α2cp−1√
β2
< α1cp−1√
β1
. Therefore, in order for
the above inequality to hold, we should have α2cp+1√
β2
> α1cp+1√
β1
, or equivalently
α2cp
√
β1 +
√
β1 > α1cp
√
β2 +
√
β2. Since β2 ≥ β1, this implies α2cp
√
β1 −
√
β1 >
α1cp
√
β2−
√
β2, which contradicts with α2cp
√
β1−
√
β1 < α1cp
√
β2−
√
β2. There-
fore, if the second investment option leads to more annual costs than the first
one does, it must be that the annual emissions level resulting from the second
investment is more than that of the first investment.
If the second investment option leads to less than or equal to annual costs
than the first one does, the annual emissions levels of the two investment options
depend on the second term of Expression (3.31). If
1−α22c2p
4c2pβ2
<
1−α21c2p
4c2pβ1
, or equiva-
lently
1−α22c2p
β2
<
1−α21c2p
β1
, holds, then the second investment option is better in terms
of retailer’s annual emissions, otherwise, its annual emissions level is more than
or equal to that of the first investment option. 
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3.2.4 Analytical Results on the Comparison of the Three
Emission Policies
In Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we derived analytical solutions to the retailer’s
problem of finding the replenishment quantity and the investment amount under
the three carbon regulation policies. We obtained two sets of results: one about
the impact of an investment opportunity on the annual costs and emissions (see
Lemmas 1, 4, and 7), and the other about how the different emission policies
change the retailer’s annual costs and emissions in comparison to a no-policy
case (see Lemmas 2, 5, and 8). Looking into the first set of results, we arrive at
the following conclusions:
• Under any of the three carbon regulation policies, total annual costs without
the investment option are greater than or equal to the total annual costs
with the investment option.
• While annual carbon emissions levels with and without the investment op-
tion are equal under the cap policy, carbon emissions level without the
investment option is greater than the carbon emissions level with the in-
vestment option under the tax policy and cap-and-trade policy.
The above results imply that having an investment option under a cap policy
does not reduce the retailer’s emission level in comparison to a case with no such
option; however, it may help him/her achieve the same carbon amount with lower
costs. On the other hand, having an investment option under a tax policy or a
cap-and-trade policy has a more pronounced effect on the retailer’s annual carbon
emissions and costs: the retailer can take advantage of the investment option and
reduce both his/her emissions and costs. From an environmental point of view,
the above implies that an investment option along with a tax policy or a cap-
and-trade policy as an emission regulation further enhances emission reduction.
Therefore, governments should enable opportunities for companies to invest in
emission reduction, particularly if a tax policy or a cap-and-trade policy is in
place.
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The second set of results leads to the following conclusion:
• In comparison to the case where there is no emission regulation in place,
the cap policy and the tax policy reduce annual carbon emissions at the
expense of increased annual total costs. (If the cap is not binding, annual
costs and emissions do not change under the cap policy.) On the other
hand, it is possible to reduce carbon emissions with decreased annual total
costs under a cap-and-trade policy.
In the next two lemmas, we present some results following a direct comparison
of the different regulation policies.
Lemma 10 For any tax policy with parameter p > 0, a better cap policy can be
designed by an appropriate choice of parameter C > 0 so that TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) <
TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) and E(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ E(Q∗2, G∗2). On the other hand, for a cap policy
with parameter C > 0, a better tax policy with parameter p > 0 cannot be found
to result in TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) < TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) and E(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) ≤ E(Q∗1, G∗1).
Proof: Consider a tax policy with parameter p > 0. Let C = E(Q∗2, G
∗
2).
Note that C > 0 because E(Q∗2, G
∗
2) > 0. It follows from the expressions for
TC1(Q,G) and TC2(Q,G), and the fact that E(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) > 0 and p > 0, that we
have TC1(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) < TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2). Furthermore, as C = E(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2), the optimal
solution of the tax policy (i.e., (Q∗2, G
∗
2)), is also a feasible solution for the newly
designed cap policy. Let (Q∗1, G
∗
1) be the retailer’s optimal solution under the cap
policy. It follows from this definition that TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ TC1(Q∗2, G∗2). Combin-
ing this with TC1(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) < TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) leads to TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) < TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2).
Also, note that E(Q∗1, G
∗
1) ≤ C, therefore, E(Q∗1, G∗1) ≤ E(Q∗2, G∗2).
For the second part of the proof, consider a cap policy with parameter
C > 0. Suppose that a tax policy with parameter p > 0 can be found so
that TC2(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) < TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) and E(Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) ≤ E(Q∗1, G∗1). By definition
of (Q∗1, G
∗
1), E(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ C, thus E(Q∗2, G∗2) ≤ C as well. This implies that
(Q∗2, G
∗
2) is a feasible solution to the retailer’s problem under the cap policy. Be-
cause (Q∗1, G
∗
1) is the optimal solution under the cap policy, it must be that
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TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ TC2(Q∗2, G∗2). This contradicts TC2(Q∗2, G∗2) < TC1(Q∗1, G∗1),
therefore a tax policy with the assumed characteristics cannot be found. 
Lemma 10 indicates that for any tax policy, it is possible to design a lower-
cost cap policy for the retailer without increasing his/her emissions levels. It
is worthwhile noting that Lemma 10 takes the perspective of the retailer by
consideration of annual costs and emissions as comparison criteria, and disregards
the government’s financial gains. A tax policy may benefit to the society in
the long run if the government uses the revenues from environmental taxes in
subsidizing green technologies. In the next lemma, we present the result of a
similar comparison between the cap policy and the cap-and-trade policy.
Lemma 11 Consider a cap policy with parameter C > 0, and a cap-and-trade
policy with parameters C > 0 and cp > 0. We have TC3(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) ≤ TC1(Q∗1, G∗1)
for any value of cp. Furthermore, given a value of the common parameter C,
there exists a positive value of cp such that E(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) ≤ E(Q∗1, G∗1).
Proof: By definition of (Q∗1, G
∗
1), we know that E(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ C. Since X =
C−E(Q∗1, G∗1) ≥ 0, it follows from the expressions for TC1(Q,G) and TC3(Q,G)
that TC3(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ≤ TC1(Q∗1, G∗1) for cp > 0. Combining this with the fact that
TC3(Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) ≤ TC3(Q∗1, G∗1), we have TC3(Q∗3, G∗3) ≤ TC1(Q∗1, G∗1).
For the second part of the proof, let us consider Expression (3.2). This ex-
pression, independent of the emission regulation type, assumes a minimum value
of
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
when Q = Qe units are ordered and G = α
2β
monetary
units are invested. Therefore, E(Q∗1, G
∗
1) ≥
√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
. Furthermore, at
very large values of cp, (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) approaches
(
Qe, α
2β
)
and E(Q∗3, G
∗
3) approaches√
2AˆhˆD + cˆD − α2
4β
. Therefore, a large enough value of cp can be chosen such
that E(Q∗1, G
∗
1) ≥ E(Q∗3, G∗3). 
Lemma 11 implies that corresponding to every cap policy, there exists a cap-
and-trade policy with lower carbon emissions and lower costs per unit time for
the retailer if the value of the carbon trading price is right. Lemmas 10 and 11
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together imply that given a tax policy it is possible to have
TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) ≤ TC1 (Q∗1, G∗1) ≤ TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2)
with appropriate values of C and cp.
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Chapter 4
Numerical Analysis
In this chapter, we present the results of a numerical study to further investi-
gate how the retailer’s annual costs and emissions change with respect to the
policy parameters, and how the investment option and its parameters affect the
annual costs and emissions under each policy. In addition to TCi (Q
∗
i , G
∗
i ) and
Ei (Q
∗
i , G
∗
i ), we define a new measure to assess the increase in costs relative to the
decrease in emissions. We refer to this measure as cost of unit emission reduction
and we define it as follows for policy i
TCi (Q
∗
i , G
∗
i )− TC (Q0, 0)
E (Q0, 0)− E (Q∗i , G∗i )
.
It is important to note that some of our analytical results in Chapter 3 pro-
vide general explanations to the issues that are brought up in this section more
explicitly. Our numerical analysis complements these findings, particularly where
only limited analytical results were possible. Because the solution under the cap
policy as given in Theorem 1 is more complex than those under the tax and the
cap-and-trade policies, it has been possible to obtain more analytical results in-
volving the latter two policies. Therefore, it is no coincidence that more of the
numerical results in this chapter concern the cap policy.
Our analysis in Chapter 3 reveals that how A
h
compares to Aˆ
hˆ
is an important
characteristic of the setting that affects the solutions under all three policies.
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Therefore, our analysis considers two sets of instances: one with A = 100, h = 3,
Aˆ = 4, and hˆ = 3, and the other with A = 10, h = 4, Aˆ = 100, and hˆ = 8.
Here, we have A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
in the first set of instances and A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
in the second set of
instances. In all instances, we take D = 500, c = 6, and cˆ = 2. In what follows,
we first present our results for the cap policy, then we proceed with our findings
on the tax and cap-and-trade policies.
4.1 Numerical Study for Cap Policy
In this section, we present the results of our numerical study on cap policy with
two main objectives: first, to characterize how the annual costs, savings achieved
by investment, and the cost of unit emission reduction change under different
values of the policy parameter C, and secondly, to gain insights on how the retailer
makes a choice between two investment options with different parameters.
Figure 4.1(a) shows an illustration of how TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) changes with respect
to varying values of C for the case of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
. Figure 4.1(b) is a similar plot
for the case of A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
. The resulting annual cost and emission levels for some
specific instances under three scenarios (i.e., cap policy, cap policy without invest-
ment, no-policy) are also presented in Table 4.1. It can be observed from Figures
4.1(a) and 4.1(b) that starting from the smallest possible values of C (based on
Expression (3.6)), TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) first exhibits a strictly decreasing pattern with
respect to increasing values of C, and then, the costs level in both figures. The
value of C after which annual costs become constant coincides with E (Q0, 0).
If C ≥ E (Q0, 0), then the cap is no longer restrictive, and the solution to the
retailer’s problem under no emission policy optimizes his/her costs under the cap
policy as well. As a result, in both figures, TC1(Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) ranges from TC1
(
Qe, α
2β
)
to TC1 (Q
0, 0). It can also be observed from both figures that a one-unit decrease
in the cap is more costly to the retailer at its already small values.
Table 4.1 reports some instances to illustrate the possible different solution
types to the retailer’s problem under the cap policy, as given in Theorem 1 (see
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Figure 4.1: Behavior of TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) for Varying Values of C Under a Cap Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
Table A.1 and Table A.2 for more illustrative examples). In the first set of
instances, characterized by A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, Q∗1 = Q
0 and G∗1 = 0 for C ≥ 1284.816.
Similarly, in the second set of instances, Q∗1 = Q
0 and G∗1 = 0 for C ≥ 2200.
For those values of C that are large enough (i.e., C ≥ 1284.816 and C ≥ 2200
in the first and second sets, respectively), having a cap policy does not change
the solution in comparison to a no-policy case because the cap amount is not
restrictive. Therefore, we have TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) = TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) = TC (Q
0, 0) in
such instances. In the third instances of each set (C = 1270 and C = 2110 in
the first and the second sets, respectively), we have TC (Q0, 0) < TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) =
TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) and E (Q
0, 0) > E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) = E (Q
∗
1(0), 0). Here, the cap policy
helps to decrease emissions at the expense of increased costs, and the retailer
does not invest in new technology to further reduce emissions even if such an
option exists. In the second instances of each set (C = 1170 and C = 1910 in
the first and the second sets, respectively), we have TC (Q0, 0) < TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) <
TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) and E (Q
0, 0) > E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) = E (Q
∗
1(0), 0). Again, the cap policy
reduces annual emissions and increases annual costs, but different than the third
instances, the investment option helps to achieve the same emissions at lower
costs in comparison to no investment opportunity. Finally, the first instances of
each set are illustrative of situations in which it is not possible to be within the
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Table 4.1: Varying Numerical Examples Under the Cap Policy for Some Values
of the Cap Given α = 4 and β = 0.01
Instances with Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(
Q0 = 182.574, Qe = 36.515, Qα = 164.114, E
(
Q0, 0
)
= 1284.816, TC
(
Q0, 0
)
= 3547.723
)
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1070 – – – 158.904 51.994 1070 3605.005 – –
1170 100 13.333 100 162.127 22.666 1170 3574.257 1170 3650
1270 172.26 7.74 172.26 172.26 0 1270 3548.649 1270 3548.649
1370 241.137 5.529 182.574 182.574 0 1284.816 3547.723 1284.816 3547.723
Instances with Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
(
Q0 = 50, Qe = 111.803, Qα = 76.376, E
(
Q0, 0
)
= 2200, TC
(
Q0, 0
)
= 3200
)
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1710 – – – 82.556 68.043 1710 3293.72 – –
1910 134.704 92.796 92.796 77.283 11.879 1910 3231.142 1910 3239.474
2110 220.918 56.582 56.582 56.582 0 2110 3201.531 2110 3201.531
2310 283.391 44.109 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
allowed emission limits without making an investment.
In Lemma 1, we have shown that TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) − TC1 (Q∗1, G∗1) ≥ 0. The
exact value of TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0) − TC1 (Q∗1, G∗1) is a measure of the savings due to
the investment opportunity under the cap policy. Figure 4.2 illustrates how this
difference changes with respect to C for the cases of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
and A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
. In
both cases, values of C for which Q∗1(0) exists are considered. As a result, we
have C ≥ 1109.545 in Figure 4.2(a) and C ≥ 1894.427 in Figure 4.2(b). Observe
also that the savings due to the investment opportunity are more significant at
tight values of the cap. Furthermore, the retailer no longer uses the investment
opportunity (i.e., G∗1 = 0) if C is greater than or equal to E (Q
α, 0).
Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) illustrate how the cost of unit emission reduction
changes for varying values of the cap in cases of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
and A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, respectively.
We know from Lemma 2 that E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) ≤ E (Q0, 0). Both figures are plotted
for those values of C at which E (Q∗1, G
∗
1) < E (Q
0, 0). Mainly, Figure 4.3(a)
considers values of C up to 1284.816 and Figure 4.3(b) considers values of C up
to 2200. Observe that in both cases, reducing the annual emission level by one
unit is more costly at small values of C. Furthermore, in case of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, the cost
of a one-unit emission increases more rapidly as C gets smaller in comparison to
the case of A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
.
Figure 4.4 shows the effect of α on total average annual cost in cap policy.
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Figure 4.2: Savings due to an Investment Opportunity for Varying Values of the
Cap Under a Cap Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
The α values are chosen to satisfy (A1) and (A4) simultaneously in both graphs
(see Table A.3 and Table A.4 for detailed solutions of the underlying instances).
Total cost is bounded below by TC1(Q
0, 0) and above by TC1(Q
e, α
2β
). It can be
observed from the plots that the retailer’s costs are lowered if he/she chooses the
investment option with higher value of α for a given β. The relation between
β and total average cost for different A
h
and Aˆ
hˆ
values is depicted in Figure 4.5.
Again, β values are chosen to satisfy assumptions (A1) and (A4) simultaneously.
The total costs are bounded below by TC1(Q
0, 0) and above by TC1(Q
e, α
2β
)
similar to Figure 4.4. We can observe from the graphs that the retailer prefers
the investment option with a smaller β among those with the same value of α.
In Lemma 3, we have shown that among two investment options with different
parameters, the retailer should choose the one with higher α and smaller β. In
Figure 4.6, we show over numerical examples that if the investment option with
higher α does not have smaller β, whether it is a better investment option or not
depends on how high the α value is. Specifically, in Figure 4.6(a), for the case
of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, setting C = 840, α1 = 9.4, β1 = 0.02, and β2 = 0.02, we change the
value of α2 and track the difference between the minimum annual costs resulting
from the two investment options. TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1|α1 = 9.4, β1 = 0.02) refers to the
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Figure 4.3: Cost of Unit Emission Reduction for Varying Values of the Cap Under
a Cap Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
minimum costs, given that the first investment option has parameters α1 = 9.4
and β1 = 0.02. Similarly, TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1|α2, β2 = 0.025) denotes the minimum costs
if the second investment option has a value of α2 as given on the x-axis, and
β2 = 0.025. Figure 4.6(a) shows that for all values of α2 < 9.656, the first
investment option has lower costs. As α2 increases beyond this value, the second
investment option becomes more preferable. Figure 4.6(b) illustrates a similar
result for the case of A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, setting C = 1700, α1 = 12.3, and β1 = 0.02,
β2 = 0.025. The second investment option becomes better as α2 is increased
beyond 12.445. Notice that for values of α2 between 12.3 and 12.445, the second
investment option still has higher α and higher β, yet the first investment option
leads to lower annual costs.
Figure 4.7 presents the retailer’s total cost indifference curves between the
efficiency parameter α and the decreasing return parameter β for the two general
cases. Figure 4.7a illustrates the case of A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
in a setting where C = 840.
Here, α takes values between 3.219 and 6, and β ranges from 0.005 to 0.026. Any
values of α and β paired on this curve lead to the same total average annual cost
(i.e., 3724.965). In Figure 4.7b, we consider the case of A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
in a setting where
C = 1700. Any values of α and β paired on this curve lead to 3297.559 as the
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Figure 4.4: Behavior of TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) for Varying Values of α
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
and C=840
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
and C=1700
retailer’s total average annual cost. In this figure, α values are between 3.636
and 6, and β ranges from 0.005 to 0.041. We can see that total cost indifference
curves have nonlinear shapes in both figures. However, they can be approximated
by linear lines over α and β. This shows that any amount of increase in the value
of the diminishing return parameter β can be compensated by almost the same
amount of increase in efficiency parameter α irrespective of the current absolute
values of α and β.
4.2 Numerical Study for Tax Policy and Cap-
and-Trade Policy
Corollary 2 and Lemma 4 provide analytical results for TC2 (Q
∗
2, G
∗
2) and
TC2 (Q
∗
2(0), 0) − TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2), which imply that both measures are increasing
in p. In our numerical analysis for the tax policy, then, we proceed with in-
vestigating the effect of policy parameter p on the cost of unit emission reduc-
tion (i.e.,
TC2(Q∗2,G∗2)−TC(Q0,0)
E(Q0,0)−E(Q∗2,G∗2)
). In Figure 4.8(a), which pertains to the case of
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Figure 4.5: Behavior of TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) for Varying Values of β
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
and C=840
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
and C=1700
A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
, the cost of unit emission reduction is strictly convex in p, with a min-
imum at p = 0.463. In our numerical experimentation with various instances
having A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, we observe that
TC2(Q∗2,G∗2)−TC(Q0,0)
E(Q0,0)−E(Q∗2,G∗2)
assumes a shape similar to
the one in Figure 4.8(a). In Figure 4.8(b), for the case of A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
, we change
the value of Aˆ to 1000 to illustrate an extreme situation where the cost of unit
emission reduction increases almost linearly with increasing p over all its possible
values.
As in the case of the tax policy, our numerical analysis for the cap-and-trade
policy focuses on investigating how the cost of unit emission reduction changes
with respect to policy parameters. Corollary 4 and Lemma 8 provide analytical
results for TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) and TC3 (Q
∗
3(0), 0) − TC3 (Q∗3, G∗3). Figure 4.9 presents
three different illustrations of how the cost of unit emission reduction behaves
with changing values of cp. In the examples underlying Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(c),
there exist values of cp (cp ≥ 0.9754 in Figure 4.9(a) and cp ≥ 1.148 in Figure
4.9(c)) at which the retailer sells his/her cap. In both of these examples, as
cp increases beyond these values, TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) gets smaller and smaller due to
the revenue earned from selling permits. TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) falls below TC (Q
0, 0)
when cp ≥ 4.061 and when cp ≥ 9.75 in the examples of Figure 4.9(a) and
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Costs under Two Different Investment Options in Case
of a Cap Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
and C = 840
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
and = 1700
Figure 4.9(c), respectively. Figure 4.9(b) illustrates an example to Corollary 3.
Because the retailer does not sell any carbon permits, regardless of the value of cp,
TC3 (Q
∗
3, G
∗
3) is always greater than TC3 (Q
∗
3(0), 0). Furthermore, as cp increases,
the cost of unit emission reduction increases.
4.3 Numerical Comparison of the Three Policies
In Section 3.2.4, we proved that for any tax policy, there exists a cap policy with
lower annual costs and no greater annual emissions. Similarly, for any cap policy,
there exists a cap-and-trade policy with no greater annual costs and no greater
annual emissions. In this subsection, we investigate how the differences between
the annual costs and the annual emissions of any two policies change with respect
to the problem parameters.
In Figure 4.10, we present two illustrations for the comparison of the cap and
tax policies in a setting with parameters A = 100, h = 3, Aˆ = 4, hˆ = 3, α = 4,
and β = 0.01. Figure 4.10(a) shows a plot of how TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) − TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2)
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and E (Q∗1, G
∗
1)−E (Q∗2, G∗2) simultaneously change for varying values of C, given
that the tax policy has p = 0.26. For values of C lower than 758.832, the tax
policy is better in terms of annual costs. As C increases beyond this value, the cap
policy becomes better in terms of annual costs and annual emissions up until C =
1227.296. For C values larger than 1227.296, the cap policy is more advantageous
because of its resulting costs, however the tax policy is better because of its
resulting emissions. Figure 4.10(b) presents a similar plot, given that tax policy
has p = 1.26. At all values of C, the cap policy is more advantageous for the
retailer because of its resulting costs. However, the tax policy leads to lower
annual emissions for the retailer in comparison to any cap policy with parameter
C ≥ 818.520. Observe from both Figure 4.10(a) and Figure 4.10(b) that there is
no value of C at which the tax policy is better for both its costs and its emissions,
as also implied by Lemma 10.
For the same setting underlying Figure 4.10, we next compare the cap policy to
the cap-and-trade policy. We consider two different values of cp for the latter: 0.26
and 1.26. Figure 4.11(a) shows how TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)−TC2 (Q∗2, G∗2) and E (Q∗1, G∗1)−
E (Q∗2, G
∗
2) simultaneously change with varying values of C when cp = 0.26. At
all values of C, the cap-and-trade policy leads to lower annual costs, however,
the cap policy results in lower annual emissions than the cap-and-trade does if
C < 1227.296. Otherwise, the cap-and-trade policy is also better in terms of
annual emissions. Similarly, Figure 4.11(b) shows that cap-and-trade policy is
more advantageous for the retailer because of its resulting costs at all values of
C, however, the dominance of one policy over another in terms of annual emissions
changes depending on the value of C. Specifically, if C ≥ 818.520, then the cap-
and-trade policy dominates in terms of both measures, otherwise, the cap policy
leads to lower annual emissions for the retailer.
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Figure 4.7: Total Cost Indifference Curves Between α and β Under a Cap Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
and TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) =
3724.965
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
and TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) =
3297.559
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Figure 4.8: Cost of Unit Emission Reduction for Varying Values of Tax Under a
Tax Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
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Figure 4.9: Cost of Unit Emission Reduction for Varying Values of the Trading
Price Under a Cap-and-Trade Policy
(a) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(Aˆ = 4, hˆ = 3)
(b) An Illustration for the Case of Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(Aˆ =
20, hˆ = 8000)
(c) An Illustration for the Case of Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
(Aˆ =
200, hˆ = 8)
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of Tax Policy to Cap Policy for Annual Costs and
Annual Emissions
(a) An Illustration if Tax Policy has p = 0.26
(b) An Illustration if Tax Policy has p = 1.26
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of Cap Policy to Cap-and-Trade Policy for Annual Costs
and Annual Emissions
(a) An Illustration if Cap-and-Trade Policy has cp = 0.26
(b) An Illustration if Cap-and-Trade Policy has cp = 1.26
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Chapter 5
An Extension to the Newsvendor
Problem
In this chapter, we extend our analysis to the newsvendor problem under a cap-
and-trade policy with an opportunity to invest in green technologies. In this
setting, the retailer sells each unit of a single product type at $r. The procurement
cost of the product is $c per unit and leftover products can be salvaged at a price
$v/unit. The retailer incurs $b as loss of goodwill cost per unit of unsatisfied
demand. The retailer’s carbon emission associated with replenishment is linearly
proportional to the replenishment quantity by a factor of e (i.e., carbon emission
quantity is e × Q units if Q units are ordered). As in the case of EOQ model
studied in earlier chapters, carbon emission can be reduced in an amount of
αG− βG2 when $G are invested in green technologies.
Demand during the single selling period, D(A, h(G)), is composed of two
elements; a random component A and a deterministic component h(G) (i.e.,
D(A, h(G)) = A + h(G). f(.) and F (.) are corresponding the p.d.f and c.d.f.
of random component A. In this setting, there is a pool of customers who are
environmentally sensitive. If $G are invested in green technologies, not only the
carbon emission is reduced, but also demand increases in an amount of h(G) due
to the existence of environmentally sensitive customers.
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Effect of environmental effort on customer demand is observed more in case
of clean production technologies rather than in case of end-of-pipe emission re-
duction technologies. Clean production technologies may increase the customers’
valuation of the product by changing product design or improving manufactur-
ing process (e.g., customers’ willingness to pay a premium for hybrid-electric car
Toyota Pirius, or increase in demand of electric vehicles as reported in Tesla Mo-
tors’ web site [41]). As mentioned in Chapter 2, a product’s environmental effect
on its demand has been studied before. Letmathe and Balakrishnan [28] model
product demand as a decreasing function of emission amount. Krass et al. [38]
put an emphasis on premium demand of different emission reduction technolo-
gies. Raz et al. [36] construct a price dependent demand model in which price
elasticity decreases (i.e., demand increases) with innovation effort shown by the
firm. Different than these studies, we model explicitly the existence of an emission
regulation policy. Also, in our problem setting, investment in green technologies
reduces emissions and increases demand simultaneously. Finally, although we
later study the special cases, our general analysis does not assume any special
functional forms for the dependency between demand and environmental efforts.
In this setting, although there is a significant number of environmentally sen-
sitive customers, we assume that there exists an upper bound on the total number
that can be attracted by investing in green technologies. Specifically, we assume
that h(G) ≤ A¯. Furthermore, we take h(G) as a nondecreasing and concave func-
tion of the investment amount (i.e., h
′
(G) ≥ 0 and h′′(G) ≤ 0 where h(0) = 0).
We also study some special cases of this function; those are h(G) = δG and
h(G) = δ(αG− βG2). The first function reflects a setting where environmentally
sensitive customers are kind of myopic in the sense that they are affected by the
information on company’s investment amount, but they are short-sighted about
how much actual reduction in emissions will be achieved. The second function re-
flects a setting where environmentally sensitive customers make more informative
decisions caring about the actual emission reduction rather than the monetary
value of the investment amount.
Other characteristics of this system are:
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(A1) The ordinal relationship between the product’s retail price, procurement
cost and salvage value as in the classical Newsboy model, also holds in this
setting. That is,
r > c > v. (5.1)
(A2) Unit underage cost of the product is more than the profit that would be
gained by selling carbon equivalent permit of one unit production at the
market price. That is,
r + b− c > cpe. (5.2)
(A3) Let QNV CT be the solution of the equation F (Q) = r+b−c−cpe
r+b−v , which is
the solution of newsvendor problem under cap-and-trade policy without
investment option. We have
eQNV CT − α
2
4β
> 0. (5.3)
Due to (A1), the retailer’s marginal profit from the sales of a unit item is
positive and there is no motivation for the retailer to order an infinite amount.
(A2) guarantees that the retailer would not be better off by not doing business in
the current season and selling all his/her carbon allowance in the market instead.
Finally, (A3) is equivalent to saying that emission due to ordering the optimal
replenishment quantity of the retailer under a cap-and-trade system without in-
vestment opportunity cannot be totally eliminated even if the maximum reduction
of emission is achieved by investment. Note that, under this assumption, we also
have eQ − α2
4β
> 0 for all Q > QNV CT . It is important to emphasize that the
retailer’s optimal order quantity without the cap-and-trade regulation, say QNV
(i.e., the Newsvendor solution), is greater than QNV CT as F
(
QNV
)
= r+b−c
r+b−v .
This, jointly with (A3), implies that eQNV − α2
4β
> 0.
In the next subsection, we formulate and analyze the retailer’s problem under
a cap-and-trade policy and assuming the existence of an investment opportunity
as described above.
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5.1 General Analysis
The retailer is subject to a carbon cap of C units under a cap-and-trade policy.
The unit carbon trading price is $cp. The timeline of events is as follows: cap
amount C is determined by policy makers and the retailer decides the production
quantity Q and investment amount G at the beginning of the period. Then,
demand is realized and the retailer sells or buys carbon allowance depending on
C at the end of the period.
The problem can be formulated as follows:
max piCT (Q,G)
s.t. eQ− αG+ βG2 +X = C,
Q ≥ 0,
G ≥ 0,
h(G) ≤ A¯.
where piCT (Q,G) = rE[min{A,Q − h(G)}] + h(G)r − cQ + cpX + vE[Q − A −
h(G)]+−bE[A+h(G)−Q]+−G. Note that an alternative expression for piCT (Q,G)
is given by
piCT (Q,G) = rE[A] + rh(G) + vQ− vE[A]− vh(G)− cQ
+(r + b− v)
∫ ∞
Q−h(G)
(Q− h(G)− a)f(a)da+ cpX −G.
Here, E[A] refers to the expected value of the random component of demand.
In the next theorem, we characterize the optimal solution of the retailer under
the cap-and-trade policy and availability of investment option. We refer to the
optimal pair of order quantity and investment amount as (Q∗, G∗).
Theorem 4 Let G1 and G2 be the investment values such that G1 =
h
′
(G1)(r−c−cpe)+αcp−1
2βcp
and h(G2) = A¯, respectively. Define Q1 and Q2 as the order
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quantities such that F (Q1 − h(G1)) = r+b−c−cper+b−v , F (Q2 − h(G2)) = r+b−c−cper+b−v .
Optimal solution of the retailer’s problem is as follows:
(Q∗, G∗) = arg max
(Q,G)∈S
piCT (Q,G)
where S = {(Q,G) ∈ S˜ s.t. Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, h(G) ≤ A¯}. Here, S˜ =
{(Q1, G1), (Q2, G2), (QNV CT , 0)}.
Proof: Plugging C − eQ + αG − βG2 in place of X, the objective function can
be rewritten as
(5.4)
rE[min{A,Q− h(G)}] + h(G)r − cQ+ cp(C − eQ+ αG− βG2)
+ vE[Q− A− h(G)]+ − bE[A+ h(G)−Q]+ −G.
The above expression is continuous and differentiable, and its Hessian matrix is(
−(r+b−v)f(Q−h(G)) (r+b−v)h′ (G)f(Q−h(G))
(r+b−v)h′ (G)f(Q−h(G)) (r+b−v)h′′ (G)F (Q−h(G))−(r+b−v)(h′ (G))2f(Q−h(G))−2βcp−h′′ (G)b
)
.
This matrix is not necessarily negative semidefinite, therefore the objective func-
tion, depending on the form of h(G), may not be jointly concave with respect to
Q and G. Hence, KKT conditions are necessary but not sufficient. The necessary
conditions for optimality are as follows:
r + b− c− cpe− (r + b− v)F (Q− h(G)) + µ1 = 0, (5.5)
cp(α−2βG)+h′(G)(r+b−v)F (Q−h(G))−1−bh′(G)−λ1h′(G)+µ2 = 0, (5.6)
λ1(A¯− h(G)) = 0 (5.7)
µ1Q = 0 (5.8)
µ2G = 0 (5.9)
λ1 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0 (5.10)
Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0. (5.11)
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There are 8 possible scenarios depending on the values of KKT multipliers.
However, only 3 of them may lead to feasible solutions.
Case 1: λ1 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0
Expressions (5.7), (5.8), and (5.9) are satisfied since all multipliers are zero.
Expression (5.5) leads to
(r + b− v)F (Q− h(G)) = r + b− c− ecp. (5.12)
Utilizing this in Expression (5.6), we obtain
cp(α− 2βG) + h′(G)(r + b− c− ecp)− 1− bh′(G) = 0,
which further leads to
G =
h
′
(G)(r − c− cpe) + αcp − 1
2βcp
. (5.13)
Referring Q1 and G1 as the order quantity and the investment amount that
simultaneously satisfy Expression (5.12) and Expression (5.13), Q1 and G1 may
be optimal if they also satisfy the feasibility conditions (those are Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0,
and h(G) ≤ A¯).
Case 2: λ1 6= 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0
Since λ1 6= 0, Expression (5.7) implies
h(G) = A¯. (5.14)
Using the above expression and the fact that µ1 = 0, Expression (5.5) can be
rewritten as
r + b− c− ecp − (r + b− v)F (Q− A¯) = 0. (5.15)
Let Q2 and G2 be the order quantity and the investment amount that simultane-
ously satisfy Expression (5.14) and (5.15). For this pair to be a feasible solution,
λ1 has to be greater than zero. Expression (5.6), which involves λ1, now reduces
to
cp(α− 2βG) + h′(G)(r + b− c− ecp)− 1− bh′(G)− λ1h′(G) = 0,
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which leads to
λ1 = (r − c− ecp) + cp(α− 2βG)− 1
h′(G)
.
λ1 > 0 should be satisfied for (Q2, G2) to be considered.
Case 3: λ1 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 6= 0
Expression (5.9) jointly with the fact µ2 6= 0 implies G = 0. Expression (5.5)
then reduces to
r + b− c− ecp − (r + b− v)F (Q) = 0. (5.16)
Note that, the above expression has a unique solution, which is QNV CT . The
feasibility of of this solution necessitates µ2 > 0. Expression (5.6), which involves
µ2, can now be rewritten as
αcp + h
′
(0)(r + b− c− ecp)− 1− bh′(0) + µ2 = 0.
Therefore, we should have 1− αcp − h′(0)(r − c− cpe) > 0. 
Corollary 6 Let the random component of customer demand have exponential
distribution with parameter θ. Then, the optimal solution is the pair among
(Q1, G1), (Q2, G2), (Q
NV CT , 0) that maximizes the retailer’s expected profits sub-
ject to feasibility conditions. Here,
G1 =
h
′
(G1)(r − c− cpe) + αcp − 1
2βcp
, Q1 = h(G1)−
ln( c+cpe−v
r+b−v )
θ
,
h(G2) = A¯, Q2 = A¯−
ln( c+cpe−v
r+b−v )
θ
,
and
QNV CT = − ln(
c+cpe−v
r+b−v )
θ
.
In the remaining part of this chapter, we will analyze the special cases of the
general problem where h(G) assumes specific forms.
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5.1.1 Analysis of Special Case I: h(G) = δG
In this case, deterministic part of demand that reflects the behavior of the environ-
mentally sensitive customers, exhibits a linearly increasing pattern with respect
to the investment amount. The optimal solution presented in the next corollary,
follows from Theorem 4. Furthermore, when h(G) assumes this special form,
proof of Theorem 4 implies that the retailer’s objective function is concave with
respect to Q and G, and hence, KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality.
Corollary 7 Let Q1 and Q2 be the order quantities such that
F
(
Q1 − δ
(
α
2β
+
δ(r − c− cpe)− 1
2βcp
))
=
r + b− c− cpe
r + b− v ,
and
F (Q2 − A¯) = r + b− c− cpe
r + b− v .
Then, optimal pair of retailer’s order quantity and his/her investment amount
can be obtained as follows:
(Q∗, G∗)) =

(QNV CT , 0) if δ(r − c− cpe) + αcp − 1 < 0,
(Q2,
A¯
δ
) if α
2β
+ δ(r−c−cpe)−1
2βcp
> A¯
δ
,(
Q1,
α
2β
+ δ(r−c−cpe)−1
2βcp
)
o.w.
5.1.2 Analysis of Special Case II: h(G) = δ(αG− βG2)
In this case, deterministic part of demand that reflects the behavior of the environ-
mentally sensitive customers, exhibits a linearly increasing pattern with respect
to the actual emission reduction amount with the use of green technologies. The
optimal solution presented in the next corollary, again follows from Theorem 4.
Corollary 8 Let G1 =
α
2β
− 1
2β(δ(r−c−cpe)+cp) , G2 =
α
2β
−
√
α2− 4βA¯
δ
2β
and G3 =
α
2β
+
√
α2− 4βA¯
δ
2β
be the investment values. Define Q1 and Q2 as the order quanti-
ties such that F
(
Q1 − δ
(
α2
4β
− 1
4β(δ(r−c−cpe)+cp)2
))
= r+b−c−cpe
r+b−v and F
(
Q2 − A¯
)
=
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r+b−c−cpe
r+b−v , respectively. Then, optimal pair of retailer’s order quantity and invest-
ment amount to his/her maximization problem can be obtained as follows:
(Q∗, G∗) = arg max
(Q,G)∈S
piCT (Q,G)
where S = {(Q,G) ∈ S˜ s.t. Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, δ (αG− βG2) ≤ A¯}. Here, S˜ =
{(Q1, G1), (Q2, G2), (Q2, G3), (QNV CT , 0)}.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we mainly study a retailer’s joint decisions on inventory replenish-
ment and emission reduction investment operating under the conditions of the
classic EOQ model. We consider three emission regulation policies; cap, tax, and
cap-and-trade. Our results provide guidelines and insights about five issues: (i)
how much the retailer should order at each replenishment and how much he/she
should invest in emission reduction to minimize long-run average costs, (ii) what
the impact of having an investment option is on the retailer’s annual costs and
emissions, (iii) how the retailer’s annual costs and emissions under an emission
regulation policy compare to those when no regulation is in place, (iv) how the
retailer should choose among different investment options available, and (v) how
the different regulation policies compare in terms of the retailer’s annual emissions
and costs.
Analytical expressions for the optimal replenishment quantity and investment
amount for the cap policy, tax policy, and cap-and-trade policy are presented
in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Our findings imply that an investment
option may help the retailer to reduce his/her costs significantly under all policies;
however, the retailer’s annual emissions level does not decrease due to investing
in case of the cap policy. Under the tax policy and the cap-and-trade policy, the
retailer always takes advantage of the investment opportunity to further reduce
his/her emissions, which implies that there is better motivation for governments
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to make investment opportunities available under the tax or cap-and-trade policy.
When carefully designed, all three regulation policies are effective in reducing
carbon emissions. The cap and tax policies always lead to higher annual costs
for the retailer compared to when no regulation policy is in place. On the other
hand, under a cap-and-trade policy, the retailer may reduce his/her costs by
selling permits equivalent to his/her excess carbon capacity. For the retailer not
to profit solely from selling permits, there must exist an upper bound on the
maximum annual carbon emission (see Corollary 5).
The investment function considered in this study has a nonlinear form char-
acterized by two parameters. Lemmas 3, 6, and 9 provide guidelines in terms of
those parameters on how the retailer should choose among different investment
options. Our results imply that in case of the cap policy, the right choice of in-
vestment opportunity may help the retailer further reduce his/her annual costs,
but it does not have an impact on annual emissions. We show that a better
investment opportunity for reducing costs may lead to more annual emissions in
some cases under a tax policy or a cap-and-trade policy. We also characterize
the cases in which it is possible to reduce both the annual costs and the annual
emissions by the right choice of investment opportunity.
We also show that for a given cap or cap-and-trade policy, it is not possible
to design a tax policy that leads to both lower costs and lower emissions. On the
other hand, for a given tax policy, a better cap policy can be designed by the
appropriate choice of cap value. Further, for a given cap policy, there may exist a
cap-and-trade policy that is better for both the resulting costs and the resulting
emissions.
In our numerical analysis, we have defined a measure that we refer to as “cost
of unit emission reduction”. This measure is the ratio of the cost increase to
the savings in emissions, and its value for a certain policy can be considered as
the social cost of that policy. We have observed that the social cost becomes
very high as the policy parameters are tightened in case of cap and tax policies
(i.e., annual carbon emission cap is decreased in cap policy, or tax paid for one
unit emission in increased in tax policy). In fact, the increase in social cost
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is more emphasized when the company’s ratio of fixed cost of replenishment to
his/her inventory holding cost rate is very high (i.e. A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
in terms of problem
parameters). This suggests, in an inventory setting under a cap or a tax policy,
reducing the company’s ordering costs along with green technologies may decrease
the social cost. However, we believe further research is needed to explore what
kind of production/inventory related parameters are of significance in reducing
cost of compliance to emission regulations. Our numerical analysis (see Figure
4.9) shows that a cap-and-trade policy, considering the measure of cost of unit
emission reduction, may sometimes be rewarding (other times costly) depending
on whether the company is able to generate excess carbon allowance to sell or
not.
The use of a quadratic emission reduction function has made it possible to
obtain analytical results that lead to the implications as discussed above. An
important characteristic of this function, which we have utilized extensively in
our analysis, is that it is a concave, increasing function until a certain value
of investment (i.e., α
(2β)
). The increasing behavior of the function upto a certain
point shows that investment in green technology is efficient in reducing emissions,
but there is a maximum potential of abatement. The concavity implies that it
becomes more costly to reduce emissions as emissions are decreased (the low
hanging fruit has been picked). The analytical expressions we have derived,
naturally depend on the parameters of this function, however, we believe our
general conclusions still hold in case of other investment functions which exhibit
these characteristics.
A similar model has also been developed for a retailer operating under the
conditions of the newsboy model assuming a cap-and-trade policy is in place.
Different than the EOQ model, the existence of environmentally sensitive cus-
tomers is taken into account. That is, an investment in green technology not
only reduces carbon emissions but also helps to attract more customers. A pre-
liminary analysis has been done for this model, however, its implications have to
be further investigated.
Our models assume a single item. An immediate extension would be to study
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the joint decisions for replenishment and allocation of limited investment budget
(for emission reduction) among multiple items to maximize the profits. The
core of our study considers a retailer operating under the conditions of the EOQ
model, which is one of the fundamental models of inventory theory. The questions
raised in this thesis can also be investigated for settings with different inventory
replenishment policies.
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Table A.1: Numerical Illustrations Under the Cap Policy for Varying Values of the
Cap Given α = 4 , β = 0.01 and A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
Instances with Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
(
Q0 = 182.574, Qe = 36.515, Qα = 164.114, E
(
Q0, 0
)
= 1284.816, TC
(
Q0, 0
)
= 3547.723
)
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1495 – – 0 109 194.14 1495 3458.485 – –
1500 – – 0 104 181.219 1500 3438.056 – –
1505 – – 0 102 173.777 1505 3426.934 – –
1510 – – 0 100 167.857 1510 3418.364 – –
1515 – – 0 99 162.76 1515 3411.155 – –
1520 – – 0 98 158.2 1520 3404.829 – –
1525 – – 0 97 154.027 1525 3399.131 – –
1530 – – 0 96 150.153 1530 3393.913 – –
1535 – – 0 95 146.516 1535 3389.074 – –
1540 – – 0 94 143.075 1540 3384.545 – –
1545 – – 0 93 139.8 1545 3380.276 – –
1550 – – 0 93 136.667 1550 3376.228 – –
1555 – – 0 92 133.659 1555 3372.372 – –
1560 – – 0 92 130.76 1560 3368.684 – –
1565 – – 0 91 127.958 1565 3365.145 – –
1570 – – 0 91 125.245 1570 3361.739 – –
1575 – – 0 90 122.61 1575 3358.453 – –
1580 – – 0 90 120.049 1580 3355.275 – –
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1585 – – 0 89 117.554 1585 3352.196 – –
1590 – – 0 89 115.121 1590 3349.208 – –
1595 – – 0 89 112.744 1595 3346.303 – –
1600 – – 0 88 110.42 1600 3343.475 – –
1605 – – 0 88 108.145 1605 3340.72 – –
1610 – – 0 87 105.917 1610 3338.03 – –
1615 – – 0 87 103.732 1615 3335.404 – –
1620 – – 0 87 101.587 1620 3332.835 – –
1625 – – 0 87 99.481 1625 3330.322 – –
1630 – – 0 86 97.412 1630 3327.86 – –
1635 – – 0 86 95.377 1635 3325.447 – –
1640 – – 0 86 93.374 1640 3323.08 – –
1645 – – 0 85 91.403 1645 3320.757 – –
1650 – – 0 85 89.462 1650 3318.475 – –
1655 – – 0 85 87.548 1655 3316.233 – –
1660 – – 0 85 85.662 1660 3314.028 – –
1665 – – 0 84 83.802 1665 3311.86 – –
1670 – – 0 84 81.967 1670 3309.725 – –
1675 – – 0 84 80.155 1675 3307.623 – –
1680 – – 0 84 78.367 1680 3305.552 – –
1685 – – 0 84 76.601 1685 3303.512 – –
1690 – – 0 83 74.855 1690 3301.5 – –
1695 – – 0 83 73.131 1695 3299.516 – –
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1700 – – 0 83 71.426 1700 3297.559 – –
1705 – – 0 83 69.74 1705 3295.627 – –
1710 – – 0 83 68.072 1710 3293.72 – –
1715 – – 0 82 66.422 1715 3291.837 – –
1720 – – 0 82 64.79 1720 3289.977 – –
1725 – – 0 82 63.174 1725 3288.139 – –
1730 – – 0 82 61.575 1730 3286.322 – –
1735 – – 0 82 59.991 1735 3284.526 – –
1740 – – 0 81 58.422 1740 3282.751 – –
1745 – – 0 81 56.868 1745 3280.994 – –
1750 – – 0 81 55.329 1750 3279.257 – –
1755 – – 0 81 53.804 1755 3277.538 – –
1760 – – 0 81 52.292 1760 3275.837 – –
1765 – – 0 81 50.793 1765 3274.153 – –
1770 – – 0 81 49.307 1770 3272.486 – –
1775 – – 0 80 47.834 1775 3270.835 – –
1780 – – 0 80 46.373 1780 3269.2 – –
1785 – – 0 80 44.924 1785 3267.58 – –
1790 – – 0 80 43.487 1790 3265.975 – –
1795 – – 0 80 42.061 1795 3264.385 – –
1800 – – 0 80 40.646 1800 3262.809 – –
1805 – – 0 80 39.242 1805 3261.247 – –
1810 – – 0 79 37.849 1810 3259.699 – –
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
1815 – – 0 79 36.466 1815 3258.164 – –
1820 – – 0 79 35.093 1820 3256.641 – –
1825 – – 0 79 33.73 1825 3255.132 – –
1830 – – 0 79 32.376 1830 3253.634 – –
1835 – – 0 79 31.033 1835 3252.149 – –
1840 – – 0 79 29.698 1840 3250.675 – –
1845 – – 0 79 28.372 1845 3249.213 – –
1850 – – 0 79 27.056 1850 3247.762 – –
1855 – – 0 78 25.748 1855 3246.321 – –
1860 – – 0 78 24.449 1860 3244.892 – –
1865 – – 0 78 23.158 1865 3243.473 – –
1870 – – 0 78 21.875 1870 3242.065 – –
1875 – – 0 78 20.6 1875 3240.666 – –
1880 – – 0 78 19.334 1880 3239.277 – –
1885 – – 0 78 18.075 1885 3237.898 – –
1890 – – 0 78 16.824 1890 3236.529 – –
1895 115.877 107.873 107.873 78 15.58 1895 3235.169 1895 3262.097
1900 125 100 100 77 14.343 1900 3233.818 1900 3250
1905 130.366 95.884 95.884 77 13.114 1905 3232.476 1905 3243.914
1910 134.704 92.796 92.796 77 11.892 1910 3231.142 1910 3239.474
1915 138.492 90.258 90.258 77 10.677 1915 3229.818 1915 3235.912
1920 141.926 88.074 88.074 77 9.469 1920 3228.501 1920 3232.919
1925 145.106 86.144 86.144 77 8.267 1925 3227.193 1925 3230.33
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1930 148.094 84.406 84.406 77 7.072 1930 3225.893 1930 3228.049
1935 150.93 82.82 82.82 77 5.884 1935 3224.602 1935 3226.011
1940 153.642 81.358 81.358 77 4.702 1940 3223.318 1940 3224.173
1945 156.25 80 80 77 3.527 1945 3222.041 1945 3222.5
1950 158.77 78.73 78.73 77 2.357 1950 3220.773 1950 3220.969
1955 161.213 77.537 77.537 76 1.194 1955 3219.511 1955 3219.56
1960 163.589 76.411 76.411 76 0.037 1960 3218.258 1960 3218.258
1965 165.906 75.344 75.344 75 0 1965 3217.05 1965 3217.05
1970 168.171 74.329 74.329 74 0 1970 3215.927 1970 3215.927
1975 170.388 73.362 73.362 73 0 1975 3214.879 1975 3214.879
1980 172.562 72.438 72.438 72 0 1980 3213.9 1980 3213.9
1985 174.698 71.552 71.552 72 0 1985 3212.983 1985 3212.983
1990 176.798 70.702 70.702 71 0 1990 3212.124 1990 3212.124
1995 178.865 69.885 69.885 70 0 1995 3211.316 1995 3211.316
2000 180.902 69.098 69.098 69 0 2000 3210.557 2000 3210.557
2005 182.911 68.339 68.339 68 0 2005 3209.843 2005 3209.843
2010 184.894 67.606 67.606 68 0 2010 3209.17 2010 3209.17
2015 186.852 66.898 66.898 67 0 2015 3208.536 2015 3208.536
2020 188.788 66.212 66.212 66 0 2020 3207.939 2020 3207.939
2025 190.703 65.547 65.547 66 0 2025 3207.375 2025 3207.375
2030 192.598 64.902 64.902 65 0 2030 3206.843 2030 3206.843
2035 194.474 64.276 64.276 64 0 2035 3206.341 2035 3206.341
2040 196.332 63.668 63.668 64 0 2040 3205.868 2040 3205.868
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2045 198.174 63.076 63.076 63 0 2045 3205.421 2045 3205.421
2050 200 62.5 62.5 63 0 2050 3205 2050 3205
2055 201.811 61.939 61.939 62 0 2055 3204.603 2055 3204.603
2060 203.607 61.393 61.393 61 0 2060 3204.228 2060 3204.228
2065 205.39 60.86 60.86 61 0 2065 3203.876 2065 3203.876
2070 207.16 60.34 60.34 60 0 2070 3203.544 2070 3203.544
2075 208.918 59.832 59.832 60 0 2075 3203.231 2075 3203.231
2080 210.664 59.336 59.336 59 0 2080 3202.938 2080 3202.938
2085 212.398 58.852 58.852 59 0 2085 3202.663 2085 3202.663
2090 214.122 58.378 58.378 58 0 2090 3202.405 2090 3202.405
2095 215.836 57.914 57.914 58 0 2095 3202.163 2095 3202.163
2100 217.539 57.461 57.461 57 0 2100 3201.938 2100 3201.938
2105 219.233 57.017 57.017 57 0 2105 3201.727 2105 3201.727
2110 220.918 56.582 56.582 57 0 2110 3201.531 2110 3201.531
2115 222.594 56.156 56.156 56 0 2115 3201.35 2115 3201.35
2120 224.261 55.739 55.739 56 0 2120 3201.182 2120 3201.182
2125 225.921 55.329 55.329 55 0 2125 3201.027 2125 3201.027
2130 227.572 54.928 54.928 55 0 2130 3200.884 2130 3200.884
2135 229.216 54.534 54.534 55 0 2135 3200.754 2135 3200.754
2140 230.853 54.147 54.147 54 0 2140 3200.635 2140 3200.635
2145 232.483 53.767 53.767 54 0 2145 3200.528 2145 3200.528
2150 234.105 53.395 53.395 53 0 2150 3200.432 2150 3200.432
2155 235.721 53.029 53.029 53 0 2155 3200.346 2155 3200.346
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2160 237.331 52.669 52.669 53 0 2160 3200.271 2160 3200.271
2165 238.934 52.316 52.316 52 0 2165 3200.205 2165 3200.205
2170 240.532 51.968 51.968 52 0 2170 3200.149 2170 3200.149
2175 242.123 51.627 51.627 52 0 2175 3200.102 2175 3200.102
2180 243.709 51.291 51.291 51 0 2180 3200.065 2180 3200.065
2185 245.29 50.96 50.96 51 0 2185 3200.036 2185 3200.036
2190 246.865 50.635 50.635 51 0 2190 3200.016 2190 3200.016
2195 248.435 50.315 50.315 50 0 2195 3200.004 2195 3200.004
2200 250 50 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2205 251.56 49.69 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2210 253.115 49.385 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2215 254.666 49.084 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2220 256.212 48.788 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2225 257.754 48.496 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2230 259.292 48.208 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2235 260.825 47.925 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2240 262.355 47.645 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
2245 263.88 47.37 50 50 0 2200 3200 2200 3200
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Table A.2: Numerical Illustrations Under the Cap Policy for Varying Values of the
Cap Given α = 4 , β = 0.01 and A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
Instances with Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
(
Q0 = 182.574, Qe = 36.515, Qα = 164.114, E
(
Q0, 0
)
= 1284.816, TC
(
Q0, 0
)
= 3547.723
)
C Q1 Q2 Q
∗
1(0) Q
∗
1 G
∗
1 E (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) E (Q
∗
1(0), 0) TC1 (Q
∗
1(0), 0)
710 39.993 199.581 -7.162 -186.171 4509.79 710 – – 0
715 49.949 198.117 -7.298 -182.702 4274.056 715 – – 0
720 56.224 196.971 -7.439 -179.227 4170.603 720 – – 0
725 61.559 195.843 -7.587 -175.747 4100.416 725 – – 0
730 66.397 194.684 -7.74 -172.26 4047.325 730 – – 0
735 70.914 193.472 -7.9 -168.766 4004.925 735 – – 0
740 75.196 192.194 -8.068 -165.266 3969.92 740 – – 0
745 79.292 190.842 -8.243 -161.757 3940.36 745 – – 0
750 83.233 189.407 -8.426 -158.241 3914.982 750 – – 0
755 87.035 187.884 -8.618 -154.715 3892.917 755 – – 0
760 90.711 186.267 -8.819 -151.181 3873.536 760 – – 0
765 94.265 184.554 -9.031 -147.635 3856.371 765 – – 0
770 97.7 182.739 -9.254 -144.079 3841.06 770 – – 0
775 101.016 180.823 -9.489 -140.511 3827.319 775 – – 0
780 104.211 178.805 -9.737 -136.929 3814.919 780 – – 0
785 107.281 176.686 -10 -133.333 3803.672 785 – – 0
790 110.225 174.47 -10.278 -129.722 3793.425 790 – – 0
795 113.038 172.163 -10.574 -126.092 3784.048 795 – – 0
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800 115.719 169.77 -10.889 -122.444 3775.43 800 – – 0
805 118.264 167.3 -11.226 -118.774 3767.479 805 – – 0
810 120.673 164.763 -11.586 -115.081 3760.115 810 – – 0
815 122.948 162.17 -11.973 -111.36 3753.268 815 – – 0
820 125.09 159.532 -12.39 -107.61 3746.879 820 – – 0
825 127.102 156.859 -12.842 -103.824 3740.897 825 – – 0
830 128.99 154.163 -13.333 -100 3735.275 830 – – 0
835 130.757 151.453 -13.87 -96.13 3729.976 835 – – 0
840 132.411 148.738 -14.46 -92.206 3724.966 840 – – 0
845 133.959 146.026 -15.114 -88.22 3720.213 845 – – 0
850 135.405 143.324 -15.843 -84.157 3715.694 850 – – 0
855 136.759 140.639 -16.667 -80 3711.384 855 – – 0
860 138.025 137.974 -17.607 -75.726 3707.265 860 – – 0
865 139.211 135.334 -18.7 -71.3 3703.318 865 – – 0
870 140.323 132.722 -20 -66.667 3699.528 870 – – 0
875 141.366 130.141 -21.597 -61.736 3695.881 875 – – 0
880 142.346 127.591 -23.67 -56.33 3692.367 880 – – 0
885 143.268 125.075 -26.667 -50 3688.973 885 – – 0
890 144.136 122.592 -33.333 -40 3685.69 890 – – 0
895 144.955 120.144 – – 3682.511 895 – – 0
900 145.729 117.73 – – 3679.427 900 – – 0
905 146.46 115.351 – – 3676.431 905 – – 0
910 147.153 113.006 – – 3673.518 910 – – 0
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915 147.81 110.695 – – 3670.682 915 – – 0
920 148.434 108.417 – – 3667.918 920 – – 0
925 149.027 106.171 – – 3665.221 925 – – 0
930 149.592 103.957 – – 3662.588 930 – – 0
935 150.13 101.774 – – 3660.014 935 – – 0
940 150.644 99.622 – – 3657.496 940 – – 0
945 151.134 97.499 – – 3655.032 945 – – 0
950 151.604 95.405 – – 3652.617 950 – – 0
955 152.053 93.339 – – 3650.251 955 – – 0
960 152.484 91.3 – – 3647.929 960 – – 0
965 152.898 89.287 – – 3645.65 965 – – 0
970 153.295 87.301 – – 3643.412 970 – – 0
975 153.676 85.339 – – 3641.213 975 – – 0
980 154.043 83.402 – – 3639.051 980 – – 0
985 154.397 81.488 – – 3636.924 985 – – 0
990 154.738 79.597 – – 3634.831 990 – – 0
995 155.067 77.729 – – 3632.771 995 – – 0
1000 155.384 75.882 – – 3630.742 1000 – – 0
1005 155.69 74.056 – – 3628.742 1005 – – 0
1010 155.987 72.251 – – 3626.771 1010 – – 0
1015 156.273 70.466 – – 3624.828 1015 – – 0
1020 156.551 68.7 – – 3622.911 1020 – – 0
1025 156.82 66.952 – – 3621.019 1025 – – 0
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1030 157.08 65.223 – – 3619.152 1030 – – 0
1035 157.333 63.512 – – 3617.309 1035 – – 0
1040 157.578 61.819 – – 3615.489 1040 – – 0
1045 157.816 60.142 – – 3613.691 1045 – – 0
1050 158.048 58.482 – – 3611.914 1050 – – 0
1055 158.272 56.838 – – 3610.157 1055 – – 0
1060 158.491 55.209 – – 3608.421 1060 – – 0
1065 158.704 53.596 – – 3606.704 1065 – – 0
1070 158.911 51.997 – – 3605.005 1070 – – 0
1075 159.112 50.413 – – 3603.325 1075 – – 0
1080 159.309 48.844 – – 3601.663 1080 – – 0
1085 159.5 47.288 – – 3600.017 1085 – – 0
1090 159.687 45.745 – – 3598.388 1090 – – 0
1095 159.869 44.216 – – 3596.776 1095 – – 0
1100 160.047 42.7 – – 3595.179 1100 – – 0
1105 160.221 41.196 – – 3593.597 1105 – – 0
1110 160.39 39.705 40 33.333 3592.03 1110 4310 1110 40
1115 160.556 38.226 50 26.667 3590.478 1115 4075 1115 50
1120 160.718 36.758 56.33 23.67 3588.939 1120 3972.122 1120 56.33
1125 160.876 35.302 61.736 21.597 3587.414 1125 3902.504 1125 61.736
1130 161.03 33.857 66.667 20 3585.903 1130 3850 1130 66.667
1135 161.182 32.423 71.3 18.7 3584.405 1135 3808.216 1135 71.3
1140 161.33 31.001 75.726 17.607 3582.919 1140 3773.864 1140 75.726
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1145 161.475 29.588 80 16.667 3581.446 1145 3745 1145 80
1150 161.617 28.186 84.157 15.843 3579.985 1150 3720.366 1150 84.157
1155 161.756 26.794 88.22 15.114 3578.536 1155 3699.097 1155 88.22
1160 161.892 25.413 92.206 14.46 3577.098 1160 3680.572 1160 92.206
1165 162.026 24.041 96.13 13.87 3575.672 1165 3664.324 1165 96.13
1170 162.157 22.678 100 13.333 3574.257 1170 3650 1170 100
1175 162.285 21.325 103.824 12.842 3572.852 1175 3637.319 1175 103.824
1180 162.411 19.981 107.61 12.39 3571.458 1180 3626.057 1180 107.61
1185 162.535 18.646 111.36 11.973 3570.075 1185 3616.034 1185 111.36
1190 162.656 17.32 115.081 11.586 3568.701 1190 3607.099 1190 115.081
1195 162.775 16.002 118.774 11.226 3567.338 1195 3599.128 1195 118.774
1200 162.892 14.694 122.444 10.889 3565.984 1200 3592.016 1200 122.444
1205 163.006 13.393 126.092 10.574 3564.639 1205 3585.673 1205 126.092
1210 163.119 12.101 129.722 10.278 3563.304 1210 3580.023 1210 129.722
1215 163.23 10.817 133.333 10 3561.978 1215 3575 1215 133.333
1220 163.338 9.541 136.929 9.737 3560.661 1220 3570.546 1220 136.929
1225 163.445 8.272 140.511 9.489 3559.353 1225 3566.611 1225 140.511
1230 163.55 7.011 144.079 9.254 3558.053 1230 3563.15 1230 144.079
1235 163.653 5.758 147.635 9.031 3556.762 1235 3560.125 1235 147.635
1240 163.755 4.512 151.181 8.819 3555.479 1240 3557.501 1240 151.181
1245 163.855 3.274 154.715 8.618 3554.204 1245 3555.247 1245 154.715
1250 163.953 2.042 158.241 8.426 3552.937 1250 3553.335 1250 158.241
1255 164.05 0.818 161.757 8.243 3551.678 1255 3551.741 1255 161.757
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1260 165.266 0 165.266 8.068 3550.442 1260 3550.442 1260 165.266
1265 168.766 0 168.766 7.9 3549.417 1265 3549.417 1265 168.766
1270 172.26 0 172.26 7.74 3548.649 1270 3548.649 1270 172.26
1275 175.747 0 175.747 7.587 3548.12 1275 3548.12 1275 175.747
1280 179.227 0 179.227 7.439 3547.816 1280 3547.816 1280 179.227
1285 182.574 0 182.702 7.298 3547.723 1284.816 3547.723 1284.816 182.574
1290 182.574 0 186.171 7.162 3547.723 1284.816 3547.723 1284.816 182.574
1295 182.574 0 189.636 7.031 3547.723 1284.816 3547.723 1284.816 182.574
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Table A.3: Behavior of TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) for given β and varying values of α when
A
h
> Aˆ
hˆ
Instances with Ah >
Aˆ
hˆ
, and C = 840
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
1.1 4787.638 2.4 4104.611 3.3 4329.701 4.1 4105.047 4.7 4164.155 5.2 4374.475
1.2 4167.901 2.5 3948.001 3.4 4026.946 4.2 3953.783 4.8 3988.236 5.3 4063.193
1.3 4034.937 2.6 3869.92 3.5 3908.663 4.3 3868.881 4.9 3893.591 5.4 3942.506
1.4 3962.513 2.7 3823.102 3.6 3839.646 4.4 3813.258 5 3831.44 5.5 3867.11
1.5 3913.912 2.8 3791.931 3.7 3794.725 4.5 3774.374 5.1 3787.395 5.6 3814.344
1.6 3877.9 2.9 3769.454 3.8 3763.789 4.6 3746.213 5.2 3754.937 5.7 3775.398
1.7 3849.639 3 3752.223 3.9 3741.571 4.7 3725.317 5.3 3730.467 5.8 3745.791
1.8 3826.612 3.1 3738.403 4 3724.966 4.8 3709.468 5.4 3711.735 5.9 3722.885
1.9 3807.346 3.2 3726.944 4.1 3712.063 4.9 3697.152 5.5 3697.204 6 3704.963
2 3790.905 3.3 3717.203 4.2 3701.679 5 3687.328 5.6 3685.766 6.1 3690.82
2.1 3776.655 3.4 3708.765 4.3 3693.068 5.1 3679.282 5.7 3676.598 6.2 3679.56
– – 3.5 3701.346 4.4 3685.755 5.2 3672.533 5.8 3669.098 6.3 3670.494
– – 3.6 3694.745 4.5 3679.423 5.3 3666.754 5.9 3662.833 6.4 3663.086
– – 3.7 3688.814 4.6 3673.856 5.4 3661.719 6 3657.497 6.5 3656.93
– – 3.8 3683.441 4.7 3668.9 5.5 3657.271 6.1 3652.872 6.6 3651.723
– – 3.9 3678.542 4.8 3664.442 5.6 3653.294 6.2 3648.804 6.7 3647.244
– – 4 3674.048 4.9 3660.398 5.7 3649.704 6.3 3645.181 6.8 3643.33
– – 4.1 3669.904 5 3656.704 5.8 3646.436 6.4 3641.921 6.9 3639.867
– – 4.2 3666.067 5.1 3653.307 5.9 3643.441 6.5 3638.962 7 3636.766
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– – 4.3 3662.498 5.2 3650.169 6 3640.68 6.6 3636.255 7.1 3633.964
– – 4.4 3659.169 5.3 3647.255 6.1 3638.122 6.7 3633.764 7.2 3631.411
– – 4.5 3656.053 5.4 3644.539 6.2 3635.74 6.8 3631.458 7.3 3629.068
– – 4.6 3653.129 5.5 3641.998 6.3 3633.515 6.9 3629.314 7.4 3626.905
– – 4.7 3650.376 5.6 3639.614 6.4 3631.428 7 3627.312 7.5 3624.898
– – – – 5.7 3637.37 6.5 3629.465 7.1 3625.435 7.6 3623.027
– – – – 5.8 3635.253 6.6 3627.613 7.2 3623.671 7.7 3621.276
– – – – 5.9 3633.25 6.7 3625.862 7.3 3622.006 7.8 3619.632
– – – – 6 3631.352 6.8 3624.202 7.4 3620.433 7.9 3618.082
– – – – 6.1 3629.55 6.9 3622.626 7.5 3618.941 8 3616.618
– – – – 6.2 3627.835 7 3621.125 7.6 3617.524 8.1 3615.232
– – – – 6.3 3626.201 7.1 3619.695 7.7 3616.175 8.2 3613.915
– – – – 6.4 3624.641 7.2 3618.33 7.8 3614.889 8.3 3612.663
– – – – 6.5 3623.151 7.3 3617.024 7.9 3613.661 8.4 3611.469
– – – – 6.6 3621.724 7.4 3615.774 8 3612.486 8.5 3610.329
– – – – – – 7.5 3614.575 8.1 3611.36 8.6 3609.239
– – – – – – 7.6 3613.424 8.2 3610.28 8.7 3608.194
– – – – – – 7.7 3612.318 8.3 3609.244 8.8 3607.193
– – – – – – 7.8 3611.254 8.4 3608.246 8.9 3606.231
– – – – – – 7.9 3610.229 8.5 3607.287 9 3605.306
– – – – – – 8 3609.241 8.6 3606.362 9.1 3604.415
– – – – – – 8.1 3608.288 8.7 3605.47 9.2 3603.557
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β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
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∗
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∗
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∗
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∗
1)
– – – – – – – – 8.8 3604.609 9.3 3602.729
– – – – – – – – 8.9 3603.777 9.4 3601.93
– – – – – – – – 9 3602.973 9.5 3601.158
– – – – – – – – 9.1 3602.195 9.6 3600.411
– – – – – – – – 9.2 3601.441 9.7 3599.688
– – – – – – – – 9.3 3600.711 9.8 3598.988
– – – – – – – – 9.4 3600.003 9.9 3598.31
– – – – – – – – – – 10 3597.652
– – – – – – – – – – 10.1 3597.013
– – – – – – – – – – 10.2 3596.393
– – – – – – – – – – 10.3 3595.79
– – – – – – – – – – 10.4 3595.204
– – – – – – – – – – 10.5 3594.634
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Table A.4: Behavior of TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) for given β and varying values of α when
A
h
< Aˆ
hˆ
Instances with Ah <
Aˆ
hˆ
, and C = 1700
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
0.9 3625.474 2 3429.838 2.8 3392.092 3.5 3349.68 4 3343.221 4.5 3329.756
1 3525.276 2.1 3395.96 2.9 3362.977 3.6 3336.633 4.1 3329.618 4.6 3319.507
1.1 3479.833 2.2 3377.754 3 3349.132 3.7 3327.768 4.2 3321.001 4.7 3312.4
1.2 3449.781 2.3 3364.757 3.1 3339.326 3.8 3320.899 4.3 3314.472 4.8 3306.836
1.3 3427.518 2.4 3354.572 3.2 3331.622 3.9 3315.249 4.4 3309.156 4.9 3302.223
1.4 3410.012 2.5 3346.187 3.3 3325.247 4 3310.434 4.5 3304.652 5 3298.268
1.5 3395.714 2.6 3339.067 3.4 3319.799 4.1 3306.233 4.6 3300.736 5.1 3294.8
1.6 3383.723 2.7 3332.888 3.5 3315.042 4.2 3302.506 4.7 3297.268 5.2 3291.709
1.7 3373.464 2.8 3327.44 3.6 3310.821 4.3 3299.156 4.8 3294.156 5.3 3288.921
1.8 3364.551 2.9 3322.577 3.7 3307.03 4.4 3296.116 4.9 3291.333 5.4 3286.382
1.9 3356.709 3 3318.192 3.8 3303.592 4.5 3293.334 5 3288.752 5.5 3284.05
2 3349.739 3.1 3314.206 3.9 3300.45 4.6 3290.771 5.1 3286.373 5.6 3281.896
2.1 3343.489 3.2 3310.559 4 3297.559 4.7 3288.397 5.2 3284.17 5.7 3279.895
2.2 3337.844 3.3 3307.201 4.1 3294.885 4.8 3286.187 5.3 3282.119 5.8 3278.027
2.3 3332.712 3.4 3304.095 4.2 3292.398 4.9 3284.121 5.4 3280.201 5.9 3276.277
2.4 3328.02 3.5 3301.208 4.3 3290.077 5 3282.183 5.5 3278.402 6 3274.632
2.5 3323.709 3.6 3298.516 4.4 3287.903 5.1 3280.359 5.6 3276.707 6.1 3273.079
2.6 3319.731 3.7 3295.996 4.5 3285.86 5.2 3278.638 5.7 3275.107 6.2 3271.611
2.7 3316.045 3.8 3293.63 4.6 3283.933 5.3 3277.008 5.8 3273.592 6.3 3270.218
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
– – 3.9 3291.403 4.7 3282.113 5.4 3275.463 5.9 3272.154 6.4 3268.895
– – 4 3289.301 4.8 3280.388 5.5 3273.994 6 3270.786 6.5 3267.635
– – 4.1 3287.312 4.9 3278.751 5.6 3272.595 6.1 3269.483 6.6 3266.432
– – 4.2 3285.427 5 3277.194 5.7 3271.26 6.2 3268.24 6.7 3265.283
– – 4.3 3283.636 5.1 3275.71 5.8 3269.985 6.3 3267.051 6.8 3264.183
– – 4.4 3281.932 5.2 3274.294 5.9 3268.764 6.4 3265.912 6.9 3263.129
– – 4.5 3280.308 5.3 3272.94 6 3267.594 6.5 3264.82 7 3262.117
– – 4.6 3278.758 5.4 3271.644 6.1 3266.471 6.6 3263.772 7.1 3261.144
– – 4.7 3277.277 5.5 3270.402 6.2 3265.393 6.7 3262.764 7.2 3260.208
– – 4.8 3275.859 5.6 3269.209 6.3 3264.355 6.8 3261.794 7.3 3259.307
– – 4.9 3274.5 5.7 3268.064 6.4 3263.356 6.9 3260.86 7.4 3258.438
– – 5 3273.196 5.8 3266.962 6.5 3262.393 7 3259.959 7.5 3257.599
– – 5.1 3271.943 5.9 3265.901 6.6 3261.464 7.1 3259.089 7.6 3256.788
– – 5.2 3270.739 6 3264.879 6.7 3260.567 7.2 3258.249 7.7 3256.005
– – 5.3 3269.579 6.1 3263.892 6.8 3259.7 7.3 3257.437 7.8 3255.247
– – 5.4 3268.462 6.2 3262.94 6.9 3258.862 7.4 3256.651 7.9 3254.513
– – 5.5 3267.386 6.3 3262.02 7 3258.05 7.5 3255.89 8 3253.801
– – 5.6 3266.346 6.4 3261.13 7.1 3257.264 7.6 3255.152 8.1 3253.111
– – 5.7 3265.343 6.5 3260.269 7.2 3256.502 7.7 3254.437 8.2 3252.442
– – 5.8 3264.372 6.6 3259.435 7.3 3255.763 7.8 3253.743 8.3 3251.792
– – 5.9 3263.434 6.7 3258.626 7.4 3255.046 7.9 3253.069 8.4 3251.161
– – 6 3262.526 6.8 3257.843 7.5 3254.35 8 3252.414 8.5 3250.547
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
– – 6.1 3261.646 6.9 3257.082 7.6 3253.673 8.1 3251.778 8.6 3249.95
– – – – 7 3256.344 7.7 3253.015 8.2 3251.159 8.7 3249.369
– – – – 7.1 3255.627 7.8 3252.375 8.3 3250.557 8.8 3248.803
– – – – 7.2 3254.93 7.9 3251.753 8.4 3249.97 8.9 3248.252
– – – – 7.3 3254.253 8 3251.147 8.5 3249.399 9 3247.716
– – – – 7.4 3253.593 8.1 3250.556 8.6 3248.843 9.1 3247.192
– – – – 7.5 3252.952 8.2 3249.981 8.7 3248.301 9.2 3246.682
– – – – 7.6 3252.327 8.3 3249.42 8.8 3247.772 9.3 3246.184
– – – – 7.7 3251.718 8.4 3248.873 8.9 3247.256 9.4 3245.697
– – – – 7.8 3251.125 8.5 3248.34 9 3246.752 9.5 3245.223
– – – – 7.9 3250.547 8.6 3247.819 9.1 3246.26 9.6 3244.759
– – – – 8 3249.982 8.7 3247.31 9.2 3245.78 9.7 3244.306
– – – – 8.1 3249.432 8.8 3246.813 9.3 3245.31 9.8 3243.863
– – – – 8.2 3248.895 8.9 3246.328 9.4 3244.851 9.9 3243.43
– – – – 8.3 3248.37 9 3245.854 9.5 3244.403 10 3243.006
– – – – 8.4 3247.857 9.1 3245.39 9.6 3243.964 10.1 3242.591
– – – – 8.5 3247.356 9.2 3244.936 9.7 3243.535 10.2 3242.185
– – – – 8.6 3246.867 9.3 3244.492 9.8 3243.115 10.3 3241.788
– – – – 8.7 3246.388 9.4 3244.058 9.9 3242.703 10.4 3241.399
– – – – – – 9.5 3243.633 10 3242.301 10.5 3241.018
– – – – – – 9.6 3243.217 10.1 3241.906 10.6 3240.645
– – – – – – 9.7 3242.809 10.2 3241.52 10.7 3240.279
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
– – – – – – 9.8 3242.41 10.3 3241.141 10.8 3239.92
– – – – – – 9.9 3242.018 10.4 3240.77 10.9 3239.568
– – – – – – 10 3241.635 10.5 3240.406 11 3239.223
– – – – – – 10.1 3241.259 10.6 3240.049 11.1 3238.884
– – – – – – 10.2 3240.89 10.7 3239.699 11.2 3238.552
– – – – – – 10.3 3240.528 10.8 3239.355 11.3 3238.226
– – – – – – 10.4 3240.173 10.9 3239.018 11.4 3237.906
– – – – – – 10.5 3239.825 11 3238.687 11.5 3237.592
– – – – – – 10.6 3239.483 11.1 3238.362 11.6 3237.283
– – – – – – – – 11.2 3238.043 11.7 3236.98
– – – – – – – – 11.3 3237.73 11.8 3236.682
– – – – – – – – 11.4 3237.422 11.9 3236.389
– – – – – – – – 11.5 3237.12 12 3236.102
– – – – – – – – 11.6 3236.823 12.1 3235.819
– – – – – – – – 11.7 3236.53 12.2 3235.541
– – – – – – – – 11.8 3236.243 12.3 3235.267
– – – – – – – – 11.9 3235.961 12.4 3234.999
– – – – – – – – 12 3235.683 12.5 3234.734
– – – – – – – – 12.1 3235.41 12.6 3234.474
– – – – – – – – 12.2 3235.141 12.7 3234.218
– – – – – – – – 12.3 3234.877 12.8 3233.966
– – – – – – – – – – 12.9 3233.718
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
β = 0.001 β = 0.005 β = 0.01 β = 0.015 β = 0.02 β = 0.025
α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1) α TC1 (Q
∗
1, G
∗
1)
– – – – – – – – – – 13 3233.473
– – – – – – – – – – 13.1 3233.233
– – – – – – – – – – 13.2 3232.996
– – – – – – – – – – 13.3 3232.763
– – – – – – – – – – 13.4 3232.533
– – – – – – – – – – 13.5 3232.307
– – – – – – – – – – 13.6 3232.084
– – – – – – – – – – 13.7 3231.865
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